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ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation:

Piracy in Southeast Asia: Examining the Present
Situation and Revisiting the Problems of Definition,
Prevention, Response and Prosecution

Degree:

Master of Science in Maritime Safety and Environmental
Protection (Nautical Stream)

This dissertation is an analysis of piracy, focusing on the present situation of piracy,
problems related to definition, prevention, response and prosecution. The objective
of this dissertation is to present a backgrounder on piracy, both historical and
present-day, and to analyze the problems associated with piracy being witnessed
today.
Piracy has existed for many a century. It has evolved from different modes and
concepts and was, in some point in time, a legal and authorized activity. It is through
history that international law on piracy was based. Modern day piracy differs quite
much from historical piracy. This is one of the reasons why the international law on
piracy failed to be in line with what modern day piracy is all about.
Particular analysis is made on piracy in Southeast Asia where most piracy incidents
occur today. Incidence and location of piracy attacks shall be analyzed, to determine
its relevance to piracy in international law. The conceptual definition of piracy in
international law as analyzed from piracy of today, has loopholes that need to be
addressed. The loopholes will be carefully examined in this dissertation, providing
the basis for recommending that piracy in international law should be re-defined so
as to suit modern day piracy and to offer uniformity among all States.
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The problem of piracy also involves an analysis and investigation of the different
phases of a piracy act. The root cause of piracy shall be discussed, enabling to
determine what can be done to stop piracy syndicates.

There has been much

publication offering recommendations to aid the ship crew in the event of piracy as
well as aid the government in the actions to take against piracy. This dissertation
examines some of those important recommendations as well as problems that hinders
the enforcement of anti-piracy, problems related to jurisdiction, investigation and
prosecution of pirates.
After analyzing all aspects of the problem related to modern day piracy, solutions
and recommendations will be offered, foremost of which involves international, not
just regional, cooperation in coming up with a uniformed guideline in the definition
in international law, enforcement, jurisdiction, investigation and prosecution.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
“Piracy, one of the traditional scourges of the sea, seemed to have been
eradicated a hundred years ago, but most of the other criminal activities
that have appeared recently are new. They serve to make life even more
difficult for the seafarers who have become accustomed to the normal
perils of the sea but could now find themselves being threatened by
criminals - and possibly being murdered.”
-IMO Background Paper on World Maritime Day 1999

In November 1999, World Maritime Day was celebrated with the theme “IMO
and the New Millennium”. An IMO Resolution was adopted during the Assembly
meeting which specifies the “Objectives of the Organization in the 2000s”. One of
the main objectives of the IMO in the new millenium is “to promote the
intensification by Governments and industry of efforts to prevent and suppress
unlawful acts which threaten the security of ships, the safety of those onboard and
the environment.” One such unlawful act that IMO considers as a significant issue is
piracy. Indeed, piracy is now a major problem in many parts of the world.
In this century, Asia is considered the nucleus of maritime trade. Maritime
trade from Europe and the Gulf pass through the Malacca Straits. Within Asia, the
South China Sea has been the busiest body of water in terms of maritime traffic. So
important that some countries that rely on maritime trade for their economy consider
piracy as a threat to their national security. The growing threat and increasing
incidence of piracy in the area has hindered smooth and effective maritime trade,
despite the presence of international organization guidelines and regulations to
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prevent and suppress piracy. For years, the International Maritime Organization has
been coordinating the efforts to minimize, if not eradicate piracy, with the help of
other concerned organizations such as the International Maritime Bureau and its
Regional Piracy Center in Malaysia. But the efforts seemed inadequate, as statistics
will show that there is an increasing incidence of piracy in the area.
There are so many issues that come to mind in discussing piracy, foremost are
the following:
•

Efforts in eradicating piracy may not be sufficient.

•

There must be something wrong with the policies and guidelines in place.

•

Shipping companies, more precisely, the seafarers may or may not know
what to do in the event of piracy aboardship.

•

International law seems vague on the issue of piracy vis-à-vis armed
robbery aboard ships. Does that distinction really help in the prevention of
piracy or should we treat both cases as a clear act of piracy regardless of
definition?

•

When pirates are apprehended, the international community does not have
the same perception and harmonized procedures in handling piracy
prosecution cases.

The above issues raised are but some of the problems related to piracy that this
author aims to examine and answer. This dissertation hopes to explain and offer
solutions on issues that has hampered the fight against piracy by providing a clear
picture of the piracy situation, particularly in Southeast Asia and by providing a
critical analysis of problem areas in piracy.
It is believed that the issue to tackle the issue on piracy is indeed timely and
important because piracy is at the forefront of IMO’s top priorities. The Philippines
has not tackled piracy with the same fervor as other maritime nations. It is hoped
that through this dissertation, international organizations as well as governments
concerned with piracy would change its doctrine in favor of putting piracy as a top

2

priority in international and national policy to protect maritime interest and
instituting the necessary changes that this dissertation intends to recommend.
This dissertation will cover the historical background of piracy as it relates to
modern day piracy. In the analysis of the problem, aspects of definition of piracy in
international law will be analyzed to consider its relevance to today’s piracy
problem. Relevant codifications on piracy will be mentioned in order to make this
dissertation a one-stop reference guide to all relevant international regulations and
resolutions on piracy.
Piracy in Southeast Asia will be analyzed. The reason for the limitation of
the analysis of piracy incidents to one specific region is because the great majority of
piracy incidents occur in Southeast Asia and that maritime traffic in the region has
remained the nucleus of maritime trade.
Problems on piracy shall be discussed, with emphasis on definition in
international law, root cause of piracy, preventive measures and countermeasures for
ships, enforcement measures for government agencies and problems related to
investigation, prosecution and punishment.
Chapter 2 will provide a historical background of piracy including
terminologies used as well as methods of piracy existing at different periods in time.
This chapter will also provide the current piracy situation in the world and explain
how incidences of piracy today are collated. Chapter 3 will discuss piracy incidents
in Southeast Asia, focusing on piracy hotspots such as the Malacca Straits, Hong
Kong-Luzon-Hainan Triangle, China/Hong Kong/Macao Area, Indonesian waters,
Malaysian waters, Gulf of Thailand and waters in Southern Philippines. Chapter 4
discusses the international law on piracy, its background and its conceptualization as
well as relevant codifications on piracy from the International Maritime
Organization. Chapter 5 is the main chapter and examines the problems related to
piracy with emphasis on definition, root cause, preventive measures and
countermeasures for ships, enforcement issues, and problems related to legislation,
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investigation, prosecution and punishment. This chapter also provides and offers
solutions in overcoming the problems mentioned. Finally, Chapter 6 provides the
summary and conclusion as well as recommendations to attain the objectives of this
dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2
PIRACY THROUGHOUT THE CENTURIES
“His name originally, it seems was Edward Drummond,
and he began his career as an honest seaman,
sailing out of his home port of Bristol, England. He is seldom
known by that name, for after he became a pirate he began
calling himself Edward Teach, sometimes spelled in the
records as Thatch, Tache, or even Tatch. Yet it was as
Blackbeard that he was, and still is , known, and it was under
this name that the people of his generation knew him, 'a
swaggering, merciless brute.”
-- Hugh F. Rankin

Historical piracy dates back to time immemorial. During those times, piracy
was synonymous to different terms used, depending on the location and activity of
the pirates. While pirates have been synonymous to outlawed plunderers for whom
violence is a necessary and inhumane action, there was a time in history when piracy
was in fact a legitimate activity sponsored by States in times of war.
2.1 Historical Background and Terminologies Used
Piracy comes from the Greek word “peiran” which means attack (Henriksson,
1996). It is an age-old practice which dates back as early as 1200 BC during the time
of the Phoenicians. In 1100 BC, Chinese and Japanese pirates operated in the South
China Sea and along the coastline from Korea to the Strait of Malacca (Asiaweek,
1992). In 700 BC, the coastline from Oman to Qatar in the Persian Gulf was known
as the Pirate Coast where Assyrian merchant vessels were attacked by Arabian and
African pirates.
The Mediterranean was also a haven for pirates. The Athenians had to defend
the Greek archipelago from pirates. The Romans were also attacked by pirates from
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Turkey. In 78 BC, Julius Caesar was captured by pirates and held for more than six
weeks until his family purchased his liberty. The Romans according to the words of
Cicero called these pirates “hostes humani generis” which means “enemies of the
human race.” After the fall of Rome in 5 AD, Turkish power became predominant in
the East and pirates coming from the Barbary States of North Africa (Morocco,
Algeria, Tunisia and Libya) replaced the Turkish pirates. From the fifteenth century
and during the start of the Holy War, pirates were employed by rulers of both sides
of the Christian-Moslem conflict. Moslem pirates and privateers operated mainly out
of the Barbary States while their Christian counterparts had their headquarters on
Rhodes and Malta (Peterson, 1989).
Pirates were also predominant along the European Atlantic Coast and the North
Sea during the medieval era. In 700 AD, Scandinavian Vikings plundered from both
land and sea from the Baltic Sea to the Strait of Gibraltar. The word “Viking” meant
sea rover or pirate in Old Norse (Peterson, 1989). After the Viking Age, pirates of
French, Scot, English, Welsh and Irish origin operated in British waters, albeit
sporadic ally, because of the firm naval policies of Henrik III, Edward I and
Edward II (Sherry, 1986).
By early sixteenth century, piracy once again became a widespread practice in
Europe. Scilly Isles and Cinque Ports in England’s southeast coast became a wellknown lair of pirate syndicates who operated in the English Channel and the Thames.
Although piracy at that time was already considered a grave offence punishable by
death, the British monarchy tolerated them since they constituted a good protection
against their enemies. However, by 1690, piracy in European waters became less,
becoming more common instead in the Americas where pirates were known as
privateers, buccaneers and corsairs.
2.1.1 Privateering
During the time when Spain, England and France were competing for
domination over the New World, privateering was used as a means of warfare.
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While piracy per se was considered an illegal activity, privateering was considered a
legal act sanctioned by states during wartime. Privateering became rampant in the
sixteenth century up to the late eighteenth century, used by states in Europe as well
as those in the eastern Indian coast, Arabian Peninsula and Southeast Asia. In order
to support the war when government finances were insufficient and the navy was
small, governments recruited privately owned vessels to capture and plunder the
enemy’s merchant vessels to disrupt trade and finances of the nation with whom they
were at war (Peterson M.J., 1989). The English government resorted to privateering
and sometimes financially supported pirates (buccaneers) and privateers to attack
Spanish and French ships, especially in the Caribbean where Spanish galleons loaded
with gold, silver, cacao and rum, were on their way from Spanish colonies in
America to Europe. This period in history was referred to as “the golden age of
piracy.”
As opposed to piracy, privateering was a legal activity because the captain of a
privateer ship help a license called “letter of marque and reprisal” which gave him
the authority to attack enemy ships. Because they were legal, privateers were not
liable to punishment and were able to sell their loot openly and legally. Lack of
supervision and control, however, led to privateers succumbing to greed and starting
to attack vessels of friendly or neutral countries.
In 1689, privateering in the Caribbean came to an abrupt end when England
made peace with Spain and went into the League of Augsburg against France
(Henriksson, 1996). Thus, privateers lost their “legal” authority and became just
plain pirates (buccaneers and corsairs), widening their area of operation to the North
American colonies along the Atlantic coast. Cities like New York, Charleston and
Boston became popular markets for pirate loots.
The ex-privateers extended their activities at the end of the seventeenth century
when trade between Europe, America and the Far East increased, especially when
big merchant fleets such as the East India Companies were enjoying good trade.
These ex-privateers set sail for the Indian Ocean to continue their illegal activities
against European and Arabian merchant ships.
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The rampant activities of the now defunct privateers who are now just common
pirates resulted in the increase in piracy incidence, which led to the changing attitude
of governments in the 1800s calling for the abolition of privateering. Also, navies
grew larger, sufficient to counter enemies during wartime. In 1856, the Declaration
of Paris formally abolished the practice of privateering. This was again reiterated in
the Second Hague Conference of 1907.
2.1.2 Buccaneers
In the sixteenth and seventeenth century, as opposed to the legal activity of
privateering, pirates other than privateers were called “buccaneers” which was a label
given to English pirates. Buccaneers means “smokers of meat” because aside from
raiding Spanish vessels, they also slaughtered cattles and smoked them on wooden
frames called “boucan” to sell to passing ships. The buccaneers were employed by
the English and French empires to deter against Spain’s quest for domination over
the New World. Primarily, the buccaneers raided Spanish galleons in the vicinity of
the Caribbean islands with the blessings and encouragement of Queen Elizabeth I
(Spence, 1995). This does not mean, however, that the activities of the buccaneers
were considered legal.

In fact, their plunderous activity was still illegal but

motivated discreetly by the English monarchy.
2.1.3 Corsairs
While the English termed them as “buccaneers,”

the French called them

“corsairs” which was the name given to French pirates who raided not only Spanish
ships but Spanish settlements as well in South American and the Caribbean islands.
Corsair comes from the Latin word “cursus” which means “race,” a term referred to
small boats that carried French pirates (Henriksson, 1996).
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2.1.4 Piracy in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries
With the increase in international trade, governments started to regard piracy as
a threat to maritime commerce and tried to solve the problem of piracy. The British
government conducted an extensive anti-piracy campaign in the Caribbean and
western Atlantic where they replaced corrupt colonial officials and adopted stricter
measures in ports. The British Royal Navy chased pirates along the West African
Coast and in the Red Sea as well. The elimination of piracy by the British Royal
Navy in Southeast Asia proved difficult because of local wars and European
diplomatic rivalries in the area concerned(Peterson, 1989).
In 1822, the United States, Spain and England carried out a similar anti-piracy
campaign in the Caribbean. The American Congress voted for the establishment of
an anti-piracy force which would clear out the Caribbean and other surrounding
waters of pirates. This proved successful, resulting in the capture and sentencing of
pirates to death or imprisonment by English, Spanish and American courts. By
1830s, organized piracy disappeared in the Caribbean.
The latter half of the nineteenth century saw the decline of piracy in major sea
areas. This can be attributed to the abolition of privateering as agreed by signatory
countries in the Declaration of Paris and the Second Hague Convention. Efforts to
abolish the slave trade between Africa and the Americans also contributed to the
suppression of piracy through the establishment of regular naval patrols in the
southern Atlantic, the Indian Ocean and the Caribbean (Henrikson 1996). Another
factor contributing to the decline of piracy in the nineteenth century was the
emergence of evangelical revivalist movements which influenced the world society
and made it less tolerant towards pirates and their violent and extravagant way of
living (Peterson 1989).
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2.2 Piracy in the 20th Century
From historical piracy to modern day piracy, incidents of piracy have
continued to rise to alarming levels. While there was a declining trend in historical
piracy as a result of actions taken to outlaw privateering as discussed in the latter
section, piracy in the 20th century has steadily increased. This section will discuss
the incidents of modern day piracy and its relation to present day international law on
piracy.
2.2.1 Data Collection on Piracy Incidents
Established in 1981, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) is perhaps the only organization that
collates a comprehensive set of data on piracy incidents.

ICC-IMB is a non-

governmental non-profit-making organization that is charged with the investigation
and prevention of maritime fraud and piracy.

It functions as a focal point for

information concerning maritime fraud and piracy for maritime companies and
governments involved in international maritime trade. It is for this reason that this
author has based his analysis of piracy incidents from the data collated by IMB
through its Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia which was
established in 1993. The PRC is a twenty-four hour information center whose
function is to receive reports of piracy incidents, alert ships and government
agencies, issue regular status reports, collate/analyze all information received and
issue consolidated reports to interested bodies/organizations.
IMB, however, defines piracy differently than the codified definition of piracy,
i.e. Geneva Convention and UNCLOS 1982 definition, which is based on
international law. The reason and analysis of conflicting definitions on piracy shall
be discussed later in the succeeding chapters.

For now, the IMB data will be

considered in the analysis of incidents of piracy worldwide, with emphasis on
Southeast Asia where the majority of piracy incidents occur.
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It should be pointed out that according to numerous scholars, the existing
statistical data on piracy is by no means a true indicator of the actual number of
incidents that takes place. Some say that piracy incidents reported represent only one
half of the actual incidents. Others even believe that the actual number of incidents
might even be ten times more that what is reported. There are a number of reasons
for failure to report an actual piracy attack or an attempted attack.

For one,

shipowners fear that their vessel will be delayed in port pending an investigation that
will disrupt the vessel’s schedule. It costs around $25,000 a day to keep a vessel in
port. Add to that, the delay in the delivery of goods and services to the intended
owner of the cargo. Another reason is that a successful piracy attack would mean
that the vessel lacks or failed to institute security measures to deter a piracy attack
and would reflect on the master’s competence. The ensuing unfavorable media
coverage of a shipowners vessel might discourage future cargo owners from using
the same vessel or vessels of the shipowner. Further, insurance premiums might
increase and seamen’s unions might demand for high risks payments. States might
downplay piracy reporting for fear of being branded as apathetic to the piracy
problem, loss of tourism, as well as commercial and national security reasons.
It is for these reasons that statistical data on piracy, while providing a good
scenario on piracy worldwide, does not render the clear and accurate picture of the
actual piracy situation.

Under-reporting also hampers the repression of piracy

because government agencies cannot react when an incident is not reported and
shipowners might be misled into thinking that a particular area is free of pirates
because the data presented does not show any incident in that area.
2.2.2 World Situation
There is reason to be alarmed with the increasing incidence of piracy
worldwide. According to IMB, the number of reported piracy incidents for the year
1999 increased 40% compared to the 1998 figures. More staggering is that the
number of piracy incidents in 1999 increased by 166%, almost triple than the number
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of incidents in 1991. Appendix A provides the IMB data and tables used on both
actual and attempted attacks from 1991 to 1999 as well as other tables in providing
an analysis of piracy incidents. The graph below gives a graphical representation of
the number of piracy incidents from 1991 to 1999 for better appreciation.
Piracy Incidents
1991 - 1999
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1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Figure 2.1
Source: Data taken from ICC-IMB Annual Report on Piracy, 2000

IMB also attempts to distinguish between actual and attempted piracy attacks
as well as the status of the vessel during the time of the incident, i.e. berthed,
anchored or steaming (Appendix A).
As mentioned earlier, the IMB definition of piracy differs from the codified
definition of piracy in that IMB defines piracy as:
“An act of boarding any ship with the intent to commit theft or
any other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in the
furtherance of that act.”
A more detailed discussion on issues related to the different definitions of
piracy is reserved for a later chapter. For purposes of this section, however, it should
suffice to point out that the IMB definition includes incidents occurring while
anchored or berthed. From the codified definition of piracy (international law),
piracy can only be committed on the high seas. For the purpose of this dissertation
since no data is available on piracy incidents occurring in the high seas, the table
below provides an analysis of the IMB data (Appendix A), with the assumption that
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the IMB data on “steaming” will be presumed as incidents occurring in the high seas.
With such assumption, it can be surmised that out of a total of 229 actual attacks in
1999, 61 or 27% of the incidents happened while the vessel was steaming and
presumed by this author to be in the high seas while 138 or 60% of the actual attacks
happened while the ship was anchored. As for 56 recorded incidents of attempted
attacks, 41 or 73% occurred while the vessel was steaming (and presumed on the
high seas) while only 15 or 27% occurred while the vessel was anchored. This
analysis is just to provide for a realistic number of piracy incidents occurring in the
high seas. While this author came up with the presumption that 27% of incidents
occur in the high seas because they were recorded by IMB as ships attacked while
steaming, it is widely accepted that this presumption is too high because most ships
attacked en route are within territorial waters of a State. Some authors claim that
there is as little as 20% of ships attacked in the high seas, while 80% of the attacks
occur in waters other than the high seas (Wood, 2000).
Actual/Attempted Attacks
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Figure 2.2
Source: Data taken from ICC-IMB Annual Report on Piracy, 2000

The IMB data reveals that for actual attacks, only 27% (61 incidents) happened
while the vessel was steaming and thus can be presumed as happening on the high
seas. This means that a good majority (63%) of actual attacks, based on this authors
presumption, while other authors claim 80% of actual attacks, cannot be considered
as piracy according to the Geneva Convention and UNCLOS definition of piracy.
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It can be surmised as well that while most of the actual attacks happen when
the ship is anchored, it is the other way around for attempted attacks where 73% of
attempted attacks happened while the ship was steaming.
In totality, counting both actual and attempted attacks, only 102 incidents or
35% out of a total number of 285 incidents in 1999 can be presumed as occurring in
the high seas. As mentioned earlier, this is just for presumption purposes since no
available data shows if the 102 incidents mentioned did indeed occur in the high
seas. There is a great possibility that these 102 steaming incidents might have
occurred in territorial waters or in the EEZ which excludes them as piracy incidents
according to the codified definition of piracy. Once again, some authors claim that
80% of the attacks occur in waters other than the high seas. What can be surely
deduced is that more incidents of attacks happen in areas not included in the codified
definition of piracy and therefore becomes less significant in the eyes of the
international community for reasons that such incidents are under the jurisdiction of
national laws. A master of a vessel, however, does not care much about definition
and legal interpretation, on whether the attack on his vessel happened in the high seas
or in territorial waters. What he cares about is the safety of his ship. It is therefore
apparent that there is a problem on the definition of piracy and how it affects actions
to be taken by governments, whether governments treat incidents that happened in
territorial waters and in the high seas with equality. This problem will be further
discussed in the succeeding chapters.
The IMB report also reveals that besides the increasing number of piracy
incidents, there is an indication that the level of violence has as well increased
substantially. In 1999, the number of incidents where pirates boarded with guns
increased as compared to 1998. Incidents where pirates were armed with knives
doubled as compared to 1998. Extreme violence, i.e., death, however, declined
(Appendix A).
Historical piracy, from the time it was known as privateering, buccaneers and
corsairs until the 18th and 19th centuries, was at a decline because of actions taken by
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states to outlaw such criminal activity. However, piracy in the 20th century, known
as modern day piracy, showed an increasing trend because of the change in purpose
of the illegal activity as compared to historical piracy, and the level of violence
cannot be discounted. The next chapter will examine piracy by analyzing incidents
occurring in Southeast Asia where the majority of piracy attacks take place.
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CHAPTER 3
PIRACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

3.1 Background
The emphasis of this dissertation on Southeast Asia is due to the fact that a
great number of piracy incidents and/or armed robbery incidents occur in this area
and the entire region has always been considered a piracy danger zone. Southeast
Asia includes the Strait of Malacca, South and East China Sea including waters
surrounding countries in Southeast Asia. Based on the IMB report (Appendix A),
165 or 60% of the 285 incidents in 1999 occurred in Southeast Asia. Indonesia
ranked first with the highest number of incidents (113), twice more than the 1998
recorded incidents. Malaysia ranked third with 18 incidents while Singapore Straits
ranked fifth with 13 incidents. Based on the IMB report, piracy attacks in Southeast
Asia varied in the number of occurrences. What is evident from the following graph
is that the year 1999 has so far the largest number of piracy attacks recorded in a
nine-year period.
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3.2 Malacca Straits
Malacca Strait is the longest strait in the world and is the main seaway
connecting the Indian Ocean and the China Sea. It is under the jurisdiction of three
coastal states, namely Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. Thus, incidents in the
area do not constitute as piracy under international law but rather as piracy per se,
depending on national laws if the countries concerned indicate that such attacks
within their territorial waters can be considered as piracy. Because of the increasing
maritime traffic in the Malacca Strait, over 600 vessels transit the strait on a given
day, the area concerned is considered notorious for piracy attacks, particularly in the
Phillip Channel close to Singapore. What makes the Malacca Strait even more
important is the fact that all tankers destined for Asia from the Persian Gulf pass
through the Strait of Malacca, oil being a major commodity imported by countries
such as Japan. States who rely on oil imports have perceived that a significant threat
to the carriage of this product could be interpreted as a direct threat to a State’s
national security.
According to Sharon (1989), 34 attacks were reported in 1995. In the IMB
report, however, there were only four reported incidents in both Malacca and
Singapore Straits. The variance in data is immaterial, however, because the IMB
report shows that indeed, the Malacca Strait is a piracy prone area since the
Indonesia side of Malacca Strait also had numerous incidents of piracy. Navigating
through the narrow Phillip Channel means that vessels will have to slow down to 10
knots. When confined to a narrow and restrictive channel, and navigating at night, a
vessel is extremely susceptible to piracy attacks. Vessels are attacked usually at
night in the cover of darkness. Pirates use small fast boats with outboard motors,
usually with sophisticated radio and radar equipment to monitor traffic and police
activity. The pirate boats approach the vessel from the stern and use grappling hooks
and ropes to climb aboard. The number of pirates might range from two to as much
as ten men armed with automatic weapons, knives and pistols which can quickly
overcome not an outnumbered crew but a defenseless crew. They usually go to the
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captain’s cabin and ransack the ship’s safe. When time permits, they also ransack
crew’s cabins for cash and personal belongings.

Pirates will try to avoid

confrontation but in some reports, crewmembers who offer resistance are tied up.
Frequent cases of piracy in this area are perpetrated by amateur pirates, i.e.
fishermen, who are driven by poverty (Asiaweek, 1992). More alarming are sporadic
incidents perpetrated by criminal syndicates who are professional pirates acting with
precision and using sophisticated equipment and automatic weapons. Their motives
include selling the cargo, and the vessel. The vessel is usually re-flagged and sold.
One recent example is the piracy attack and hijacking of MV Alondra Rainbow on
October 22, 1999. The vessel was loaded with 7,000 metric tonnes of aluminum
ingots and sailed from Kuala Tanjung, Indonesia to Miike, Japan. Shortly after
departure, the vessel was attacked and hijacked by pirates armed with guns and
swords. The crew were transferred to an old ship and set adrift off the west coast of
Thailand. Ten days after, they were rescued by a Thai fishing boat. The IMB Piracy
Reporting Center in Malaysia alerted all vessels and government agencies in the
region.
On November 14, a master of a ship reported sighting a ship with the same
description as Alondra Rainbow in the Arabian Sea.

The Indian Coast Guard

dispatched a patrol aircraft to search the area. Upon sighting, the Indian Coast Guard
reported that the suspect ship bore the name Mega Rama and flew the Belize flag. A
quick check by the IMB revealed that no such ship was registered with Belize. The
Indian Coast Guard sent a patrol craft to intercept the vessel 70 miles west of
Ponnani. Despite warning shots, the vessel continued to disregard the coast guard.
An Indian navy corvette (INS Prahar) was sent to pursue the suspect vessel and on
November 16, 1999, the vessel was apprehended 170 miles west of Goa. The fifteen
pirates attempted to destroy evidence by setting the ship on fire and scuttling the
ship. The timely response of the Indian coast guard prevented and gained control of
the vessel which was towed to Mumbai. Discovery of documents revealed that 3,000
tonnes of aluminum ingots worth US$4.5M were discharged at an unknown
destination, undoubtedly sold in connivance of a buyer who knew that such shipment
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is stolen cargo. Discovery of credit cards, thousands of dollars in various currencies
and the fact that two of the pirates had featured in earlier cases of hijackings suggest
that the pirates are part of a larger syndicate.
It is said that professional pirates such as the example above are members of
criminal syndicates. Some say that such syndicates are operating out of Singapore
but the international shipping community suspects that the Indonesian navy, marine
police or customs agents are involved in this unlawful business. This is somewhat
plausible since the skill and discipline of the pirates indicate that they are well
trained in combat. According to a senior Singapore shipping company official,
Indonesian customs vessels were until 1985 extracting bribes from every ship plying
between Singapore and Indonesia. Otherwise, it was alleged, the ships had to stay
for two or three days while customs were checking their entry permit. However, the
permits were abolished in late 1985, and after that pirate attacks in Indonesian waters
increased dramatically. This has given rise to the suspicion that the piracy has
replaced the bribes as the customs officers’ source of extra income (Asiaweek,
1988).

This assumption, however, cannot be supported by evidence and the

Indonesian government denied such accusations (Asiaweek, 1992).
While Indonesia and Malaysia deny the existence of widespread piracy in the
Malacca Strait and claim that the situation is highly exaggerated, Singapore has taken
measures against piracy within its territorial waters. The Singaporean authorities, for
example, have a special VHF radio frequency for reporting incidents. They also
advice ships on measures to be taken to prevent boarding and recommend that transit
within the Strait be done at night.
Recent news items indicate that Indonesia and Malaysia are now taking steps to
contribute in the region’s anti-piracy campaign. The Indonesian Director General of
Sea Transport admitted that foreign ships using the Straits are wary of the increasing
number of piracy attacks and many of these attacks were reported to be carried out
by Indonesian pirates who are part of a syndicate. These syndicates are usually
headed by foreigners. The Indonesian Government had asked the Indonesian Navy
to help curb the piracy attacks. On August 1999, an Indonesian court jailed Mr.
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Chew Chang Kiat alias Mr. Wong for six years for masterminding a series of
piratical attacks. Mr. Chew is a Singaporean national. He was said to be responsible
for the hijacking of tankers in the Malacca and Singapore straits. Apparently, the
head of Mr. Wong’s syndicate is stationed in China. The hijacked tankers converted
to phantom ships, and their cargoes are sold in China. According to IMB, Mr.
Wong’s international network operated from China, Hong Kong, Philippines and
Malaysia (IMB, 2000).
Malaysia has also started to contribute in the anti-piracy campaign. It was
reported that police authorities in Malaysia will conduct air patrols to protect local
fishermen who are frequent targets of pirates (IMB, 2000).
There have been attempts to solve the piracy problem in the Malacca Strait
through regional cooperation. In 1992, Indonesia made agreements with Singapore
and Malaysia on coordinated sea patrols, a common radio frequency, exchange of
information and mutual assistance in hot pursuit of pirates. Indonesia also created a
special anti-piracy team called “Sampata” (Time, 1992).
The main problem with regards to piracy in the Malacca Strait is that the
attacks take place in territorial waters which renders the international law of piracy
and the universal jurisdiction inapplicable. This shall be explained in succeeding
chapters.
3.3 South China Sea and the Rest of Southeast Asia
3.3.1 Hong Kong-Luzon-Hainan Triangle and China/Hong Kong/Macao Area
The South China Sea particularly in the Hong Kong - Luzon (Philippines) –
Hainan (China) Triangle as well as the China/Hong Kong/Macao area, the Sulu Sea
bordering the Southern Philippines with Indonesia and Malaysia, and the Gulf of
Thailand are considered piracy prone waters where a significant number of piracy
attacks have taken place over the years.
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Victims of piracy attacks are diverse

compared to piracy incident in the Malacca Straits. These include cargo ships,
tankers, fishing vessels, small ferries and Vietnamese boat refugees.
In the Hong Kong – Luzon – Hainan Triangle, the peak of piracy incidents
occurred in 1993 where 27 incidents where reported. From the IMB report, the
number of piracy incidents in the area seems to be declining over the years with zero
reported incidents in 1998 and 1999.

Incidents of piracy in the Triangle are

comparable to incidents of piracy in the China/Hong Kong/Macao area which had,
according to the IMB report, 31 incidents of piracy in 1995.
Some incidents of piracy in both areas were reported to have been perpetrated
by groups of fifteen to twenty pirates in Chinese military uniforms using 20-meter
speedboats which resemble a Chinese navy or police vessel and armed with heavier
weapons. The Chinese government has been accused of being behind some of these
piracy acts. It seems that Chinese anti-smuggling units established in 1992 were
conducting patrols not only in Chinese territorial waters but also in international
waters where China has said time and again that the South China Sea forms part of
China’s territorial claim and jurisdiction. These Chinese anti-smuggling units were
said to have exceeded their powers and seized ships indiscriminately, motivated by
their right to a share of the supposed “smuggled” cargo carried by ships.

For

instance, on January 6, 1993, the Danish freighter MV Arktis Star was attacked by six
men in Chinese military uniforms who approached the vessel in a speedboat and
fired at her with rocket-propelled grenades (Telegraph Magazine, 1993). On March
20, 1994, the Honduran cargo ship MV Tequila was hijacked while lying at anchor in
Hong Kong waters. The Hong Kong marine police observed the attacking ship
disappear off the radar screen among a group of islands controlled by the Chinese
navy (The Economist, 1994).

The Chinese government denied all allegations.

Recently, however, the Chinese authorities had declared their cooperation in the antipiracy campaign.

China has recently sentenced to death and later executed in

December 1999, 13 pirates in connection with the murder of 23 Chinese seamen
onboard MV Cheung son which was hijacked on November 16, 1998. The 13 death
convicts were among the 38 pirates accused of sea robbery, murder, drug trafficking
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and illegal possession of guns and ammunition. Nineteen pirates were given prison
sentences and fines. One of those sentenced to death was Huang Daming whose ship
was used as the mother ship from where the pirates were able to launch its pirate
attacks. It is interesting to note that the same ship owned by Huang Daming was
previously used for customs border patrols.
China’s Ministry of Public Security, in response to official acknowledgements
of the piracy problem, had decreed the creation of specialized marine departments to
handle piracy. The Chinese government, during the 71st Session of the Maritime
Safety Committee of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) held in May
1999, affirmed their stance to suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships and
appealed for international cooperation in combating transnational piracy (IMB,
2000).
3.3.2 Gulf of Thailand
Although piracy in the Gulf of Thailand where the victims are Vietnamese boat
refugees has been in the decline because of the improving political situation in
Vietnam, it is worth examining how international efforts have contributed to its
decline.

The Gulf of Thailand was before considered as a piracy prone area,

particularly during the time of the exodus of Vietnamese boat refugees in the early to
late 1980s. Vietnamese boat refugees who travel to Thailand and Malaysia are
robbed of their life savings and often murdered, raped, mutilated and finally thrown
into the sea in the course of a piracy attack (Henriksson, 1996). Sometimes, girls and
women are abducted and brought to the prostitution networks in Bangkok and the
Island of Koh Kra, where they are sold to brothels (Kasemsri, 1989).
The pirates operate in the shadow of a large fishing fleet and are allegedly Thai
fishermen who by these unlawful means try to extend their financial income
(Boulanger, 1989). In 1980, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) provided the Thai government with a non-armed surveillance vessel to
patrol the waters and the first Anti-Piracy Programme commenced, financed
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bilaterally by a donation of $2 million to Thailand from the United States. The
program continued until 1981 when it ceased because the US and Thailand could not
agree on how the programme should be financed. The UNHCR referred the situation
to the Secretary General of the United Nations and to the International Maritime
Organization resulting in the introduction of the second Anti-Piracy Programme
which started on July 1982. This program was supported by UNHCR and funded by
twelve donor countries, namely, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Federal
Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, United
Kingdom and the United States. It involved the Royal Thai Navy, the marine police,
the land police and the Harbour Department.

The UNHCR functioned as the

coordinator and the point of review and consultation between the donor countries and
the Thai government.
The programme started with increase of sea patrols but the efforts were
unrealistic considering that there are 33,000 square kilometers of Thai waters to
cover.

The programme shifted to on-shore investigation of attacks, based on

descriptions of boats and pirates provided by surviving refugees, intelligence
operations, training of personnel and law enforcement activities.

After the

introduction of the Anti-Piracy Programme, the number of attacks against boat
refugees in the Gulf of Thailand have clearly reduced but some problems made
effective suppression difficult. As mentioned, the area where the attacks occur is too
large to be covered by a few patrol boats and aircrafts. To exacerbate the situation
further, there are around 27,000 fishing boats registered to fish in the area, plus
several thousands more that have false or no registration at all which makes the
tracking of suspected pirates difficult. As a solution, the Thai Harbour Department
started to use a new system of registration monitored by computers donated by the
Norwegian government which facilitates the identification of boats suspected of
being involved in piracy (Henriksson, 1996). Few prosecutions have so far been
undertaken for piracy committed against the boat refugees because of the difficulty
of identifying the offenders and the fear of the victims to testify against them.
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3.3.3 Southern Philippines
The Philippine Archipelago consists of some 7,100 islands. The primary mode
of transportation relies on inter-island sea travel using ferries and small cargo
vessels. Further, the barter trade between the Philippines and its two neighbors,
Indonesia and Malaysia, has increased merchant trade activity in the Southern
Philippines, particularly in the Sulu Sea and Celebes Sea.

The biggest factor

affecting piracy in the southern part of the country, however, is the insurgency
problem that has been going on for the past three decades. In the late 1980s, piratical
acts in the area were allegedly committed by members of the separatist Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
who are said to loot fishing vessels, small ferry vessels and cargo vessels in order to
finance the separatist movement. This is supported by the fact that MNLF rebels in
land resort to coercion and asking for large sums of money from landowners in
exchange for so-called protection, in essence, meant “you give me money and I will
not bother you.” The MNLF rebels cum pirates were known as “ambak pare” which
means “jump, buddy”, an order given to victims forced at gunpoint to jump into the
sea. The attacks often involve torture and acts of mutilation, for instance ears sliced
off or knees smashed by bullets to make swimming impossible (Asiaweek, 1988). In
the 1990s, the Philippine government brokered a peace accord with the MNLF but
failed to do the same with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) which is still
fighting for an independent Islamic state in the Southern Philippines. Further, the
Abu Sayyaf, a Muslim extremist group has been blamed for local terrorist acts
including piratical acts, kidnapping for ransom and bombings. The Abu Sayyaf
group has been accused of carrying out abductions in 1998. The victims in those
cases were released unharmed after large ransoms were paid. On June 14, 1999, two
Belgian nationals were kidnapped from their yacht while enroute from Zamboanga to
Santa Cruz island. Their vessel was intercepted by another vessel carrying heavily
armed men. Seven other passengers aboard the victim’s vessel were left aboard
unharmed. Unlike in the Malacca Strait where regional cooperation on piracy is
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evident, the Philippines has no agreement with Malaysia and Indonesia concerning
the suppression of piracy in the area concerned.
The Philippine Sea as well as other inland waters in the Philippines are also
frequented by criminal gangs including fishermen motivated by poverty and
unemployment. Other areas prone to piracy include Tawi-Tawi, Jolo, Zamboanga,
Basilan, along the Mindanao coast, in Manila Bay and other parts of the coast
between Santa Cruz and Batangas in the Philippines. Disguised as fishermen or
passengers, they attack fishing vessels, commuter ferries, cargo boats and boat
refugees in order to get money or valuable personal items and the incidents often
involve acts of violence. Some incidents, however, are perpetrated by well organized
syndicates who forge registration papers and established connections to sell pirated
ships and their cargo. An example is the hijacking in 1991 of MT Tabangao, an oil
tanker servicing the domestic trade. She was renamed three times and was trading in
Singapore before Indonesian Customs police apprehended the vessel. Philippine
authorities apprehended five suspects including a Singaporean national.

Those

apprehended were apparently involved in at least four other hijacking incidents. The
MT Tabangao incident is an example of what problems a government encounters,
especially on problems of jurisdiction because it involves other countries (in this
example, Singapore and Indonesia). The MT Tabangao incident is also an example
of a piracy incident not included in the definition of piracy in international law
(Geneva Convention and 1982 UNCLOS) but treated as piracy in Philippine laws.
The problem is exacerbated when such treatment of incident in Philippine laws
differs from how Singapore and Indonesia should treat such incident. This shall be
explained in detail in the succeeding chapters.
According to the IMB report, the Philippines experienced the highest piracy
attacks in 1996 with 39 reported incidents compared to 24 reported incidents in 1995.
The Philippine authorities, however, recorded far greater number of piracy and
armed robbery incidents because it defines piracy differently than the codified
definition of piracy in international law. For instance, the Philippine government
recorded 132 incidents of piracy in 1998 compared to only 15 reported by IMB. In
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1999, the Philippine government reported 72 incidents compared to 6 incidents
reported by IMB. Below is a table comparing the number of piracy incidents
recorded by IMB as compared to incidents recorded by the Philippine Coast Guard
(PCG). Appendix B provides the Philippine Coast Guard Report on Piracy. The
report also includes a situationer on piracy in the Philippines as well as actions taken
by the Philippine government in the anti-piracy campaign.
Piracy Incidents in the Philippines
YEAR

Philippine Report

IMB Report

1991

81

0

1992

132

5

1993

175

0

1994

174

5

1995

145

24

1996

142

39

1997

213

16

1998

132

15

1999

72

6

Table 3.1
Source: Data taken from Piracy Report of the Philippine Coast Guard and IMB Report 2000

Philippine authorities have so far failed to take any effective measures against
piracy because of the current capability of agencies involved in piracy including
inadequate resources, the geographical configuration and the economic condition of
the country. There are not enough navy and coat guard vessels to patrol the entire
sea area of the country. Further, patrol crafts are not powerful enough to compete
with the pirates’ fast boats with speeds of 30 to 40 knots. However, the Philippine
government is actively pursuing the anti-piracy campaign with the acquisition of
faster patrol crafts and institutionalization of the anti-piracy campaign by
coordinating the efforts of different agencies in the suppression of piracy.
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CHAPTER 4
CODIFICATION OF THE LAW ON PIRACY

The purpose of this chapter is to provide the relevant regulations on piracy
based on international law in order to better understand the problem of piracy.
Besides relevant codifications on piracy, this author also intends to discuss
non-mandatory

documentations

such

recommendations in combating piracy.

as

international

organization’s

This chapter will not include national

codifications on piracy because of the diversity and different notions applied by
different coastal states. Piracy under municipal or national laws are diverse because
many coastal states differ in their treatment of piracy in their territorial waters
including punishment for the offence of piracy. Further, coastal states believe that
crimes committed within territorial waters constitute crimes against the state and not
against the international community. Thus, a problem exists when piracy incidents
occur in territorial waters and international law does not recognize such incident as
piracy (i.e. IMO categorizes such incidents as armed robbery). This problem shall be
discussed in the next chapter.
4.1 Piracy Under International Law (Piracy Iure Gentium)
It was during the seventeenth century when the jurisdictional basis of the law
of the sea was founded. During this time, States accepted the doctrine that divided
the seas into territorial sea over which a coastal state exercised sovereignty and
exclusive jurisdiction, and the high seas which is the area beyond the territorial sea
where the doctrine of freedom of the seas prevailed. With the doctrine of freedom of
the seas came the “universality principle” whose purpose is to entitle any state to
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seize and punish pirates on the high seas (Henriksson, 1996). This principle was
based on two reasons, namely, that pirates attacked the ships of all states
indiscriminately and were thus a threat to all states, and that pirates were not subject
to the authority of any state and therefore no state could be held responsible for their
actions (Halberstam, 1988).

The universality principle formed the basis of the

international concept of piracy.
The codification of piracy in international law was started in 1926 when the
League of Nations tasked a sub-committee of the Committee of Experts for the
Progressive Codification of International Law to compile a report on piracy. The
Assembly of the League of Nations decided to select piracy as a topic for its
Codification Conference and the Harvard Law School undertook the task to prepare a
draft convention. The draft convention was published in 1932 but was never adopted
in any multilateral treaty. However, it was the first attempt to analyze piracy and
problems that surround the subject (Dubner, 1980).
4.1.1 The 1958 Geneva Convention
It was during the first session of the International Law Commission (ILC) in
1949 when the ILC planned on creating a regime for the high seas that the subject of
piracy was considered. The ILC used the Harvard draft convention as a working
basis but the ILC’s final report submitted to the General Assembly in 1956 was more
restrictive than the Harvard draft convention. The Harvard draft convention allowed
for the seizure of a pirate ship within the territorial jurisdiction of another state under
certain conditions, which was not included in the ILC’s report. Further, the Harvard
draft convention included in its acts of piracy the possibility of a ship preparing to
make attacks in territorial waters or on land from the high seas while the ILC report
was restricted to piracy acts in the high seas only (Dubner, 1980).
The ILC report was used during the discussions of the United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea held in Geneva in April 1958 and subsequently
adopted by the Conference. The relevant codification on piracy is contained in
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Articles 14 to 21 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas which entered
into force on September 30, 1962.
Article 14 of the Geneva Convention provides for the general principle that “all
States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the
high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.” All signatories
to the Geneva Convention are therefore only obliged to provide the necessary
support and cooperation to piracy incidents only in areas other than territorial waters
of another coastal state.

Present day piracy, however, knows no borders.

Jurisdiction, enforcement and prosecution of piracy acts have been hampered by the
restrictive codification of piracy in international law. Chapter 5 will further discuss
the problem of definition.
4.1.2 The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
The United Nations Third Conference on the Law of the Sea from 1973 to
1982 was convened for the purpose of producing a single treaty on the international
law of the sea. The Conference resulted in the adoption of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea on 30 April 1982 (UNCLOS) which entered into
force on 16 November 1994. UNCLOS contains eight articles on piracy, Articles
100 to 107. These articles in UNCLOS are more or less the exact replicas of the
articles in the 1958 Geneva Convention (Appendix C).
4.1.3 Piracy in International Customary Law
States that are not signatories to the 1982 UNCLOS or the 1958 Geneva
Convention follow international customary law. It is true that a great majority of
states have ratified either one of the above codifications. Needless to say, if a State
is not a signatory, that State will treat piracy based on international customary law.
The international customary law of piracy is derived from the theory that pirates are
“hostes humani generis” which means “enemies of the human race.” That is why
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piracy up to this day is considered a “crime against humanity.” Piracy is one of two
offences (the other is slave trade) which fall under the principle of universal
jurisdiction or the universality principle. This means that any state may apprehend a
pirate on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state and
try him before its municipal courts (Henriksson, 1996).
The concept of piracy under international customary law, however, is a vague
concept.

Under international customary law, piracy was just defined as an

unauthorised act of violence committed by a private vessel on the open sea against
another vessel with an intent to rob or plunder (Halberstam, 1988). Such vague
description of piracy produced different interpretations. For example, it was argued
whether an intent to rob should be a necessary element to constitute piracy. There
are instances when destruction of goods on board a vessel should be treated as piracy
despite the absence of an intent to rob. There was also the question on whether the
crew who commits mutiny aboard the vessel and converted the vessel and its cargo
for their own use should be considered an act of piracy. These issues were left
unanswered in the original definition of piracy under international customary law. It
is for these reasons that popular clamor suggested a codification of piracy in
international law where all states signatory to such codification will treat piracy
based on a unified definition.
The codified definition of piracy in the 1958 Geneva Convention and the 1982
UNCLOS does not totally supersede the original international customary law of
piracy for the very reason that there are states that may not be signatories to either
convention containing the codified definitions. However, since a majority of the
states are signatory to either or both the 1958 Geneva Convention and the 1982
UNCLOS, the codified form of piracy under international law remains to be the
underlying concept in the treatment of piracy in international law.
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4.2 International Maritime Organization (IMO)
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is a specialized agency of the
United Nations established in March 1958 which deals with all matters relating to the
safety of international shipping, and the promotion of maritime standards and
efficiency. The IMO is an advisory body that has no formal powers of enforcement
which is left to the responsibility of the member states (Villar, 1985). It is for this
reason that IMO has acted on the problem of piracy only on a consultative manner by
issuing recommendations in the form of resolutions and disseminating information
on piracy. It differs from conventions in that conventions are mandatory to all
signatory states while resolutions are non-mandatory, leaving it up to the
Administrations to implement such recommendations to their own satisfaction.
In 1979, IMO adopted a resolution relating to “Barratry and Unlawful Seizure
of Ships and their Cargoes” (Res. A.461(XI)) which called for a further study of the
subject in order to determine the steps IMO should take. In 1981, IMO adopted
Resolution A.504(XII) on “Barratry, Unlawful Seizure of Ships and Their Cargoes
and Other Forms of Maritime Fraud” based on provisions designed by an Ad Hoc
Working Group in cooperation with the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). This resolution recommended that all
member states review and if necessary improve their national laws relating to the
prevention and suppression of all forms of maritime fraud, examine their law
enforcement procedures and take necessary action for the effective prevention,
investigation and detection of maritime fraud and the prosecution of persons and
bodies involved. The above two resolutions do not explicitly address piracy as it
dealt generally on maritime fraud which would mean any dishonest act in connection
with maritime affairs. IMB defines maritime fraud as a combination of various
criminal acts such as forgery, barratry, piracy, theft and arson.

However, the

emphasis on such acts is more on the economic side, i.e., where one or more parties
end up loosing money, goods or even the vessel. Barratry, for example, is defined as
the loss or damage caused to the ship or cargo by the willful act of the master or
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seamen. Such actions cannot be considered as piracy as no violence has taken place.
It can be deduced, however, that IMO’s activities in the field of piracy started at this
time since there are similarities in the suppression of maritime fraud to the
suppression of piracy.
It was in 1983 when IMO devoted its attention solely on piracy. At that time,
the government of Sweden submitted a report to the IMO’s Maritime Safety
Committee (MSC) following a piracy attack on the Swedish vessel Tarn. The report
contained a proposal to formulate a resolution relating to the crime of piracy where
governments should provide information on acts of piracy and should take all steps
necessary to prevent the occurrence of such acts within or outside their waters. The
MSC also received a report from the IMB containing the nature of piracy attacks and
measure taken by governments. The MSC prepared a draft text which was used as
the basis for Resolution A.545(13) on “Measures to Prevent Acts of Piracy and
Armed Robbery Against Ships” adopted by the IMO Assembly in November 1983.
This Resolution can be considered as the first action of IMO solely for the fight
against piracy. Among others, the resolution contained four main points, namely:
a. It notes with great concern the increasing number of incidents involving
piracy and armed robber and recognizes the grave danger to life and the
grave navigational and environmental risks to which such incidents can give
rise.
b. It “urges Governments concerned to take, as a matter of highest priority, all
measures necessary to prevent and suppress acts of piracy and armed
robbery from ships in or adjacent to their waters, including strengthening of
security measures.”
c. It “invites Governments concerned and interested organizations to advise
shipowners, ship operators, shipmasters and crews on measures to be taken
to prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery and minimise the effects of such
acts.”
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d. It requests the IMO Council to keep the matter under review and take such
further action as it may consider necessary in the light of developments.
The fourth point paved the way for other resolutions on piracy as time
progressed. Because of this, the MSC in 1984 decided to establish a separate and
fixed agenda item in its work programme entitled “Piracy and Armed Robbery
Against Ships.” The MSC started to receive reports on piracy submitted by member
states and international organizations which were later disseminated starting 1986 to
coastal States concerned for comments and advice on the actions taken with regard to
the incidents reported.
Coinciding with the hijacking of Achille Lauro in October 1985, the IMO
Secretariat reported that “despite international pressures, progress in stemming the
increase in violent attacks at sea has been scant” and thereby concluded that
“governments are not yet convinced of the need for them to take adequate preventive
action” (Walkate, 1989). The UN General Assembly in 1985 considered the Achille
Lauro incident and requested the IMO to study the problem of terrorism aboard or
against ships with a view to making recommendations on appropriate measures. The
MSC prepared a paper drafted by the U.S. Coast Guard and was subsequently
adopted by the IMO Assembly on 20 November 1985 entitled Resolution A.584(14)
on “Measures to Prevent Unlawful Acts Which Threaten the Safety of Ships and the
Security of their Passengers and Crews”. This resolution contained guidelines for
governments, ship operators, shipmasters and crews to take steps to strengthen port
and on-board security against terrorist acts. It also directed the MSC to develop a
more detailed and practical technical measures including both shoreside and
shipboard measures to ensure the security of passengers and crews on board ships
and also to design a form for reports on incidents and measures taken to prevent their
recurrence. Thus, on September 1986, the MSC came up with MSC/Circ. 443
entitled “Measures to Prevent Unlawful Acts Against Passengers and Crew on Board
Ships”. This document applies to passenger ships engaged on international voyages
of 24 hours or more and the port facilities which serve them.
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It contains

recommendations concerning the establishment of a port facility security plan and a
ship security plan that shall provide for measures to prevent the occurrence of
weapons on board ships and unauthorized access to the passenger terminal, to the
ship and to restricted areas on board.

The document also provides for the

appointment of a port facility security officer who is responsible for the preparation
of the plans and their implementation.
Realizing that there is an alarming increase in the number of piracy incidents
and that many incidents of piracy have not been reported or have not been brought to
the attention of IMO, the IMO Assembly adopted Resolution A.683(17) in 1991
entitled “Prevention and Suppression of Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against
Ships” which urged member States to report to IMO all incidents of piracy and
armed robbery against ships under their flags and invited coastal States to increase
their efforts to prevent and suppress such acts committed in their waters.
In 1992, the MSC issued MSC/Circ. 597 which recommends the use of search
and rescue (SAR) services and mobilization of maritime authorities so that action
could be taken to provide assistance to ships under attack or to pursue the pirates
with the minimum of delay (Henriksson, 1996).
Also in 1992, the IMO Secretary General Mr. William A. O’Neil established a
Working Group composed of ten IMO member countries to prepare a report
outlining the problem in the Strait of Malacca and providing recommendations on
safety precautions and enforcement arrangements appropriate for crews, shipowners,
flag States, coastal States and port States for dealing with piracy and armed robbery
against ships. The report of the Working Group was considered by the MSC and in
1993, two circulars were issued, namely:
a. MSC/Circ. 622 on Recommendations to Governments for Preventing and
Suppressing Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships
b. MSC/Circ. 623 on Guidance to Shipowners and Ship Operators, Shipmasters
and Crews on Preventing and Suppressing Acts of Piracy and Armed
Robbery Against Ships
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In the same year, the IMO Assembly adopted Resolution A.738(18) on
“Measures to Prevent and Suppress Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships”
which contained additional measures to prevent and suppress piracy and armed
robbery against ships. The Resolution contained two main points, namely:
a. Recommendation for masters of ships to immediately report attacks or
threats of attack to the nearest rescue and coordination center and request
such coordination centers to immediately warn shipping in the immediate
vicinity of the attack, as well as inform promptly the local security forces to
implement any contingency plans they have for dealing with such incidents.
b. A request to the MSC to adopt a special signal for use by ships under attack
or threat of attack.
The IMO together with the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and
the

International

Mobile

Satellite

Organization

(Inmarsat)

has

included

“piracy/armed robbery attack” as a category of distress message which ships can
transmit through either Digital Selective Calling (DSC) or Inmarsat equipment by
pressing a button. The message can be received automatically by shore stations and
ships in the vicinity. The MSC circulated MSC/Circ. 805 dated 06 June 1997
entitled “Guidance on the Use of Signals by Ships Under Attack or Threat of Attack
from Pirates or Armed Robbers” to all member States inviting and recommending
the use of such communication facilities in reporting a piracy attack.
In October 1998, IMO sent a mission of experts to South East Asia and Central
and South America to discuss the current piracy situation and to consider the
adoption of the measures to suppress piracy as contained in MSC/Circ. 622 and
MSC/Circ. 623. This was followed up by a seminar in Brazil in 1998 and in
Singapore in February 1999. The seminars also aimed at considering the possibility
of developing regional cooperation agreements between neighboring countries for
coordinated patrols and other appropriate measures.
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In May 1999, the MSC discussed the outcome of the two missions to Southeast
Asia and South America and as a result incorporated corresponding revisions to
MSC/Circ. 622 and MSC/Circ. 623 with the issuance of MSC/Circ. 622/Rev. 1 and
MSC/Circ. 623/Rev. 1 respectively (IMO, 2000).
The table below provides a summary of all IMO resolutions and circulars
pertaining to piracy:
IMO Resolutions and Circulars
Document Number
Res. A.461(XI)

Year
1979

Title
Barratry and Unlawful Seizure of Ships and
their Cargoes
Barratry, Unlawful Seizure of Ships and
Their Cargoes and Other Forms of Maritime
Fraud
Measures to Prevent Acts of Piracy and
Armed Robbery Against Ships
Measures to Prevent Unlawful Acts Which
Threaten the Safety of Ships and the
Security of their Passengers and Crews
Measures to Prevent Unlawful Acts Against
Passengers and Crew on Board Ships
Prevention and Suppression of Acts of
Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships

Res. A.504(XII)

1981

Res. A.545(13)

1983

Res. A.584(14)

1985

MSC/Circ. 443

1986

Res. A.683(17)

1991

MSC/Circ. 597

1992

the use of search and rescue (SAR) services
and mobilization of maritime authorities so
that action could be taken to provide
assistance to ships under attack or to pursue
the pirates with the minimum of delay

MSC/Circ. 622

1993

MSC/Circ. 623

1993

Res. A.738(18)

1993

Recommendations to Governments for
Preventing and Suppressing Piracy and
Armed Robbery Against Ships
Guidance to Shipowners and Ship
Operators, Shipmasters and Crews on
Preventing and Suppressing Acts of Piracy
and Armed Robbery Against Ships
Measures to Prevent and Suppress Piracy
and Armed Robbery Against Ships
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MSC/Circ. 805

1997

MSC/Circ. 622/Rev. 1

1999

MSC/Circ. 623/Rev. 1

1999

Guidance of the Use of Signals by Ships
Under Attack or Threat of Attack from
Pirates or Armed Robbers
Recommendations to Governments for
Preventing and Suppressing Piracy and
Armed Robbery Against Ships
Guidance to Shipowners and Ship
Operators, Shipmasters and Crews on
Preventing and Suppressing Acts of Piracy
and Armed Robbery Against Ships
Table 4.1

4.3 The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention)
On October 7, 1985, Achille Lauro, a cruise liner of Italian registry was
hijacked by four armed men in international waters thirty miles from Port Said,
Egypt.

This incident differed from piracy under international law (piracy iure

gentium) for two reasons. First, piracy could not have been committed since it did
not fulfill the requirement on piracy that the attack should have been directed from
one vessel to the other. This two-vessel principle did not exist in the Achille Lauro
incident because the attackers were passengers of the vessel. Second, piracy was not
committed because the intent of the attackers was not “for private ends”. The
attacker’s motives were strictly political when they demanded the release of fifty
Palestinians in Israeli prisons.
The incident was therefore considered as an act of maritime terrorism. At that
time, there did not exist any mechanism to combat maritime terrorism such as those
existing for terrorist acts in airplane hijackings and sabotage as contained in the
Hague and Montreal Conventions, the Hostage Convention and the Convention on
Internationally Protected Persons (Henriksson, 1996). So, on September 1986, the
governments of Austria, Egypt and Italy presented to IMO a Draft Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. In
November 1986, the IMO Council established an Ad Hoc Preparatory Committee on
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the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation whose
task was to prepare a draft convention based on the one submitted by the three
governments.

After a series of meetings, the agreed Draft Convention was

forwarded for consideration in a diplomatic conference held in Rome on March 10,
1988. The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, otherwise known as the SUA Convention, was adopted and
signed by 23 states. As of November 1994, 27 states had ratified the Convention.
There is a significance of the SUA Convention with regards to piracy. To this
very day, piracy remains to be a broad concept. Although piracy in international law
such as the 1958 Geneva Convention and the 1982 UNCLOS provides for the legal
basis for dealing with piracy while IMO Resolutions and Circulars provides for
recommendations and guidelines in the treatment and suppression of piracy, there
remains a loophole in the whole international spectrum of piracy in that incidents that
do not satisfy the two-ship requirement and “for private ends” requirement are not
considered as piracy and that no legal provision exists for the groundwork on
prosecution. Take the case of the Achille Lauro incident. Some States have national
laws that will provide for the prosecution of the perpetrators of the Achille Lauro
incident in the ambit of committing the act of piracy.

The US requested the

extradition of the perpetrators because of the death of an American aboardship and
charged the perpetrators for committing an act of piracy under Federal Laws.
Further, although piracy has been well defined in international law, the fact
remains that piracy and armed robbery are dealt with as a single entity, i.e. contained
in a single report. This author has not encountered any report that separates piracy,
armed robbery and maritime terrorism.

The fact remains that the international

community distinguishes piracy from armed robbery and maritime terrorism, but
considers the latter two as actions that should be punishable in the same level as
piracy, meaning, as a “crime against humanity”.
The SUA Convention lists down unlawful acts under Article 3, i.e. “seizes or
exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of
intimidation”,

but falls short of concretely including piracy.
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Crimes under

international law are therefore not included and that jurisdiction is limited to the state
of nationality of the offender, the flag state, and the state within whose territorial sea
the offence was committed. As opposed to piracy whereby any State can have
jurisdiction over piracy committed in the high seas.
Perhaps the most important part of the SUA Convention is the “extradite or
prosecute” clause contained in Article 10, as follows:
“The State Party in the territory of which the offender or the
alleged offender is found shall … if it does not extradite him, be obliged
without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was
committed in its territory, to submit the case without delay to its
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through
proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State.”
States are therefore obliged to prosecute an offender, if it decides not to
extradite the offender, under its national laws and shall treat the offence as a grave
nature under the law of that State.
There have been instances mentioned in Chapter 3 where the problem of
jurisdiction and prosecution hampered the apprehension of piracy offenders, such as
the case of the MT Tabangao where three countries are involved, namely, the
Philippines where the vessel is registered, Singapore where the vessel was found to
be trading after being hijacked, and Indonesia where the vessel was apprehended.
This is perhaps the reason why even IMO recommends and urges
Governments to ratify the 1988 Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. Although the SUA Convention is
limited to maritime terrorism, some provisions of the SUA Convention will make it
easier for States to deal with piracy particularly when other countries are involved in
the apprehension and prosecution of pirates. Further, for incidents not falling under
the ambit of piracy can be dealt with in the SUA Convention.
The SUA Convention clearly defines the offenses and obligates some states to
establish jurisdiction.

Further, it obligates any state within whose territory the

perpetrators are found to either extradite them to another state or to bring them
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before its own courts. In contrast, piracy under the 1958 Geneva Convention and the
1982 UNCLOS do not obligate any state to try pirates or to extradite them to another
state. This means that in the treatment of piracy, a loophole exists on the prosecution
process.
As an endnote to the discussion of the SUA Convention, maritime terrorism or
for that matter, all acts of terrorism today are considered crimes against humanity.
The SUA Convention is limited only to States that have ratified the convention.
Unlike piracy which is based on international law, either customary or through the
1958 Geneva Convention or the 1982 UNCLOS, the SUA Convention does not have
the same effect of universal jurisdiction such as that of piracy. It is worth noting that
only a handful of Governments have ratified the SUA Convention although terrorism
is considered a global threat today.
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CHAPTER 5
CONTENTIOUS ISSUES AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

This author could not have said it better when the IMO report “Piracy and
Armed Robbery at Sea” mentioned that “one problem that has emerged in recent
years is that uncertainties about the law have meant that persons suspected of piracy
have often been released without charge” (IMO, 2000).
This chapter will discuss the problems and obstacles hampering the anti-piracy
campaign, particularly on the conceptual definition of piracy, the root cause of
piracy, dilemma on preventive measures and countermeasures by ships, and
difficulty in enforcement and prosecution by states.

Possible solutions in

overcoming these obstacles will also be discussed.
5.1 Conceptual Definition of Piracy
Article 101 of the 1982 UNCLOS defines piracy as:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation,
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private
ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i)

on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against
persons or property on board such ship or aircraft

(ii)

against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside
the jurisdiction of any State

(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of any
aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
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(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in
subparagraph (a) or (b).
There is a substantial difference between piracy today compared to piracy in
the olden days. Besides, historical piracy that existed in the past was directed mostly
against merchant vessels. Today, because of increasing world trade and increase of
merchant shipping as well as reliability in water transport as a primary mode of
transportation of goods and passengers for various reasons primary of which is less
cost, piracy today is directed to more types of vessels, with varying reasons from the
most common robbery to the most sophisticated syndicate activity. Thus, we need to
analyze whether the definition of piracy is applicable today as it was when the
codification of piracy in international law was created.
The problem of the conceptual definition of piracy in international law (piracy
iure gentium) can be best approached by explaining some key words or phrases in
the definition as provided by the 1982 UNCLOS that proves to be vague or needing
of further explanation.
5.1.1 “any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation”
There is no question that piracy is committed by an illegal act, be it with the
use of force or not. Violence does not necessarily have to be a necessary element in
the determination of piracy since the definition includes the word “or” which means
that detention or any act of depredation can happen without the presence of violence,
or vice versa. The underlying problem here is that an act of depredation without
violence or detention can be considered as piracy. Depredation in its broadest
meaning can include acts of theft, irregardless of its magnitude. Therefore, any
simple acts of theft such as an unarmed perpetrator climbing aboard a vessel from an
outrigger and stealing, say, some paint in the paint locker room or some mooring
lines, can be considered as an act of piracy even though such actions are in most
cases only considered as a felony. This simple act of theft should not be considered
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as piracy. If it was, this means that if national law regulates that piracy should be
meted the punishment of reclusion perpetua or even death, the simple act of theft
such as the one described above might be considered as a crime of piracy as the
illegal act itself satisfies all the other requirements of piracy. This author believes
not.

We should draw the line when you compare acts of theft in terms of

magnitude, especially when no violence or threat to life is committed. For example,
one should compare the stealing of cans of paint or mooring lines with the stealing of
the ship’s safe containing huge amounts of the crew’s salary without the knowledge
of the master and the crew. There is, therefore, a vague notion existent in the phrase
“any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation” because it does
not provide for the magnitude of such illegal action.
Another flaw is the distinction between robbery and piracy.

IMO which

follows the definition of piracy based on the 1982 UNCLOS deems it fit to limit
piracy as acts committed in the high seas and classifies those committed in territorial
waters or waters other than the high seas as armed robbery. A person other than a
passenger or crew of the same vessel, for example, who robs the master’s ship safe,
be it with intent to commit violence or with threat and intimidation, may be
considered as piracy rather than armed robbery. This author believes that there is a
flaw in the definition because such actions in criminal law are considered as robbery
and not piracy. I believe that there is a necessary element in the definition of piracy
that should be included. There should be an act to take control of the vessel as one of
the elements to distinguish robbery from piracy. Again, the gravity of an offence is
of primary importance in distinguishing piracy from armed robbery. To take control
or attempt to control a vessel by a person other than the master of a vessel should be
a necessary element in the determination of piracy.
A master who connives with a syndicate and commandeers a vessel to a port
other than the intended destination, and sells the goods as well as converts the vessel
to a phantom ship is not piracy iure gentium but barratry which is covered by
appropriate IMO resolutions. This should be clearly distinguished because barratry
can be committed without any act of violence, detention or depredation but only an
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act to commit fraud, i.e. when the crew connives with the master to carry out the
illegal act. However, when a crew or passenger takes control of a vessel from the
master through either violence, detention or depredation, such act should be
considered piracy. The element of a two-ship requirement shall be discussed later in
this chapter.
The phrase “any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation”
should include an act to control the vessel as a mandatory element in the definition of
piracy. Further, the act of depredation should be limited by listing down such act of
depredation in terms of gravity for it to be a requirement in the definition of piracy.
5.1.2 “committed for private ends”
The “for private ends” criterion was adopted by the 1958 Convention from the
Harvard draft convention. The reason why the Harvard group excluded political acts
in the definition of policy was not because of the intention of limiting the piracy
definition but because the group encountered problems at that time in determining
the status of insurgents (Henriksson, 1996).

Apparently, there did not exist in

international law any principles to distinguish them from belligerents where the law
of war is used and what treatment should be given to insurgents. It was apparent that
the Harvard group faced a blank wall in considering if insurgents should be treated,
in the purview of piracy, as committing the act of piracy or a lawful act of war if they
were treated as belligerents. To resolve the issue, the Harvard group decided to limit
the piracy criterion to “for private ends”. Accordingly, it would seem that the “for
private ends” criterion was done in haste rather than careful analysis because the
group did not solve the issue but rather went around the issue by limiting the piracy
criterion to “for private ends”.
Some scholars believe that the rational for excluding acts of insurgents in the
definition of piracy is that their actions are only directed against a particular state
they are in rebellion with and cannot therefore be considered as a crime against
humanity. It was also argued that if the said insurgents direct their attack against a
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neutral state, then and only then can it be considered as piracy. What these scholars
failed to consider is

the determination of a “neutral state”, whether they were

referring to the flag or nationality of the vessel or the citizenship of persons within
the vessel who were harmed as a consequence of the piratical act. The example of
the Achille Lauro incident and the insurgency problem in the Philippines as
described below illustrates this problem.
In analyzing the “for private ends” criterion, one should look into who commits
actions other than “for private ends” and what political motives are exempted in the
piracy definition.
The weakness of the criteria “for private ends” can best be described by the
Achille Lauro incident where the vessel was commandeered in 1985 by members of
the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), a splinter group of the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) who initially planned to attack the Israeli Port of Ashdod but
later demanded the release of fifty Palestinians held in Israeli prisons in return for the
safe release of the ninety-seven passengers who were kept as hostage on board the
ship (Henriksson, 1996). The 1982 UNCLOS definition of piracy excludes political
acts. The PLO were considered as recognized insurgents and acts committed by
recognized insurgents are assumed to be based on a political motive. Some authors
believe otherwise. They claim that the acts committed, particularly the murder of a
disabled American citizen, was based on a pure malicious motive or a desire for
private revenge instead of political reasons.

Despite the initial purpose of the

hijackers to attack Israel, the seizure of the ship and the murder became a “private
revenge act” which the hijackers committed when they realized that their initial
purpose had been frustrated (Halberstam, 1988).
A consideration in the determination of the “for private ends” criterion is when
the political motive is directed to a person whose citizenship is other than the country
where the political motives should have been directed. In the Achille Lauro incident,
the PLO’s motive as a recognized insurgent is to retaliate against its enemy, Israel.
In the process, however, an American citizen is murdered. Assuming no conflict
exists between the PLO and the US, the act of murdering an American citizen should
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not be considered a political motive because the US was not its target of retaliation in
the first place.
Also, maritime trade and maritime transport is a complex system where
political identity is not determined.

The Achille Lauro incident

shows that

irregardless of political motives, the murder of an American citizen when the US is
not a target for such political motive, shows that “for private ends” remain to be a
vague concept when it exempts recognized insurgents and belligerents from
committing an act of piracy. Piracy in international law excluded acts of belligerents
because belligerents follow the laws of war. International law, however, failed to
distinguish insurgents and belligerents.

For belligerents where the law of war

follows, their acts should only be directed to vessels whose nationality they are at
war with. For insurgents, their actions should only be directed to vessels of the state
they are fighting, i.e., MILF and Abu Sayaff attacking Philippine vessels. Piracy in
international law failed to understand that vessels today are complex in nature. A
vessel may be registered in one country (to establish nationality of vessel) but owned
by a shipping company of another country. Such vessel can have crews of different
nationalities. The same holds true with cruise vessels with passengers of different
nationalities. If an illegal act is committed to a vessel owned by the state for which a
recognized insurgent group is fighting with, does it necessarily follow that such
insurgent group can exact an illegal act to the crew or passengers who have a
different nationality?
There is also the issue of when the motive is political but the actions itself does
not constitute a political act but an illegal act of murder, robbery and rape. In the
Philippines, for example, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Abu Sayaff are considered as recognized
insurgents by the Philippine government who are waging a war to create an
autonomous Muslim country in the Philippines.

Just recently, the Abu Sayaff

kidnapped foreign tourists of different nationalities from a resort in Malaysia and
brought them to an island in the Philippines. While the motive is political, i.e.,
calling for an independent Muslim country in Southern Philippines as well as other
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demands, the kidnapping itself included a ransom demand of an unspecified amount
of money.

Further, the act of kidnapping was not directed to a citizen of the

Philippines but to citizens of different nationalities. The Abu Sayaff and the MILF
have been engaged in kidnapping and extortion activities in the past years. Piracy
incidents in the Sulu Sea have been attributed to these groups who robbed passengers
at gunpoint, commandeered the vessel and its cargoes, murdered and mutilated
bodies as well as raped women passengers. These groups apparently resorts to
kidnapping for ransom, robbery and extortion activities for the purpose of financing
their political organization, so they say. Assuming that the illegal act is committed in
the high seas, such illegal act by a recognized insurgent group cannot be considered
as piracy iure gentium for the very reason that the act was not committed “for private
ends” according to the definition.
There is, therefore, a flaw in the definition of piracy in that “for private ends”
is a vague terminology whereby insurgents and belligerents can be exempted in
committing piracy. While it is true that in historical piracy, actions for political
reasons have been exempted, this is not the case for modern piracy where insurgents
hide under the cloak of international law when a flaw exits, so that their actions will
not be considered as piracy.
This author believes that the “for private ends” criterion should be removed
from the definition of piracy to be in line with present day realities of piracy. To
overcome the problem associated with this criterion, IMO came up with the SUA
Convention as explained in Chapter 4. The SUA Convention which focuses on
maritime terrorism has some similarities in the definition of piracy except that
maritime terrorism is committed for political ends and that the act of maritime
terrorism can be committed without the “two-ship requirement” in piracy. This is
because terrorists usually pose as passengers aboardship. This author tends to agree
with some writers who believe that piracy should include acts of maritime terrorism,
including acts of insurgents and that the SUA Convention, although presently is a
helpful instrument in the jurisdiction and prosecution problem associated with piracy
and armed robbery, should be incorporated in the international law of piracy (piracy

48

iure gentium) because there is no distinction between a pirate and a maritime
terrorist. Both are enemies of mankind and both commit crimes against humanity.
5.1.3 “by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and
directed … against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or
property on board such ship or aircraft”
This criterion specifies that in order for an illegal act to be considered as piracy
iure gentium, the “two-ship requirement” should be satisfied. This means that the
illegal act must be committed by persons coming from another vessel who boards the
other vessel to perform the illegal act of violence, detention or depredation. In order
for piracy to be committed, there should consist an attack from one ship against
another.
It is not clear why this criterion was included in the definition of piracy in
international law. Perhaps it was because historically, piracy was only committed by
a pirate ship against another vessel. This, however, does not hold true in modern day
piracy. Some countries have included illegal acts of the crew of a vessel as an act
that can constitute piracy. For example, England treats mutiny as an act of piracy.
The situation today is that more and more illegal acts of violence, detention or
depredation are in fact committed by the crew or passengers of a vessel. The Achille
Lauro incident best portrays how an illegal act can be committed without the
presence of another vessel because the pirates are in fact passengers of the hijacked
vessel.
Article 101 paragraph (a)(ii) mentions that the illegal act, so as to constitute
piracy, is directed “against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the
jurisdiction of any State” (emphasis added). This statement differs from paragraph
(a)(i) which is more precise in saying that the illegal act is directed “on the high seas,
against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or
aircraft” (emphasis added). While the latter clearly specifies that another ship is
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involved, the former doesn’t use the word “another”, making the reader believe that
the paragraph (a)(ii) can refer to the same ship or vessel.
Another evidence to support the claim that the two-ship requirement is not
necessary in defining piracy is the statement that the illegal act is committed “by the
crew or passengers of a private ship” (emphasis added) and directed, as per
paragraph (a)(ii), “against a ship.” In the analysis of the statement, it can be deduced
that passengers of a ship (the pirate ship), in a practical sense, could not have
directed a piracy attack against another vessel because they have no control over the
pirate ship to order it to come alongside the victim ship. Therefore, the use of the
word “passenger” in the phrase could have meant that passengers of the same vessel
can commit piracy (Menefee, 1990), because a passenger cannot attack another
vessel if he does not have control of a pirate ship.
Using the same line of thinking, common sense dictates that piracy
committed “by the crew or passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft”
(referring to the pirate ship/aircraft) and directed “against another ship or aircraft”
(referring to the victim ship/aircraft) is a misnomer in the sense that a pirate aircraft,
for the sake of analysis, could not have committed piracy against another aircraft,
unless there is already technology to transfer a pirate from one aircraft to another. It
is for this reason that, when referring to piracy committed by an aircraft, it could only
mean that the said piracy must have been committed on the same aircraft, either by
the crew or the passenger of the same aircraft.
As for the use of the word “crew”, the same reasoning applies. The crew of a
pirate ship can commit piracy by attacking another vessel as mentioned in paragraph
(a)(i) but also, using the same reasoning, the crew of a vessel can attack “a” ship, a
vague statement that could also mean the same vessel. This particular reasoning on
the word “crew” in the piracy definition is subject to debate because in international
law, there is a clear distinction between piracy and mutiny. Further, the Harvard
Group from which the 1982 UNCLOS definition is based and from which the ILC
shares the same opinion, clarifies that more than one ship has to be involved in the
action. The Harvard Group explicitly stated in its comment that acts of mutiny is a
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domestic matter which falls under the laws of the flag state only and which cannot be
considered as piracy except when the mutineers use the vessel to commit attacks
against other shipping (Henriksson, 1996).
The ILC mentioned that “acts committed on board a ship by the crew or
passengers and directed against the ship itself, or against persons or property on the
ship, cannot be regarded as piracy” (Harlow, 1986). This seems to be the majority
opinion by most authors. Acts such as mutiny, internal seizure by the passengers and
robbery of one passenger by another, are not included in the definition of piracy.
The argument is that to include the illegal acts of the crew or passengers on the same
vessel might be construed that every unlawful act of violence or depredation
committed entirely within the ship would be under the universal jurisdiction of all
states. It is believed that internal offenses committed on board a ship should, as long
as it remains under the protection of the flag state, be suppressed and punished by
this state only, unless the flag state asks for assistance by other nations (O’Connel,
1984).
Despite popular opinion, this author believes otherwise. First of all, to limit
piracy so as not to include internal offenses just because such offence is the primary
responsibility of the flag state is not in line with what modern piracy is all about.
Popular opinion fails to analyze, perhaps because piracy syndicates did not exist
during those times, that in modern day piracy, pirates can in fact be those posing as
passengers aboard the same vessel. The crew could also be members of a piracy
syndicate. To distinguish it from barratry, i.e. when the master defrauds the ship
owner by conniving with a syndicate to sell the ship and cargo, in order for the crew
to commit piracy, the act of taking control of the vessel from the master by means of
an unlawful act of violence, detention or depredation should be present as
recommended in Chapter 5.1.1.
As mentioned above, there is that fear that all illegal acts aboard the same
vessel without the presence of another vessel (the pirate ship) might be construed as
an act of piracy. For example, a passenger robbing another passenger, a passenger
murdering another passenger, a crew member stealing the ship’s safe, might be
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construed as an act of piracy.

In order to exclude such actions, this author

recommended in Chapter 5.1.1 that as part of the requirement in the determination of
whether a piracy act was committed, the act of taking control of a vessel or intention
to take control of a vessel should be a necessary requirement in order to commit
piracy. This way, unlawful acts in the piracy definition will be selective, meaning,
not all illegal acts fall under the purview of piracy.
This author agrees with the opinion that how an offender arrives aboard a
victim ship, be it with the use of a pirate ship or posing as a crew or passenger aboard
the vessel, is not necessarily relevant as long as their purpose is to seize the ship by
use or threat of violence, detention or depradation.
5.1.4 “on the high seas” or “in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State”
Article 86 of the 1982 UNCLOS describes the high seas as “all parts of the sea
that are not included in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), in the territorial sea or in
the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.”
Here, therefore, lies the flaw when Article 101 defines piracy as acts “on the high
seas.” This would mean that piracy in international law is only committed in the
high seas, excluding territorial waters and the EEZ.
When a piracy attack is committed in internal or territorial waters, the crime of
“piracy” will fall under national or municipal laws, if such provisions in local laws of
a State provide for such a crime. However, when the crime of “piracy” happens in
the EEZ, a State cannot exercise her sovereignty or exclusive jurisdiction by
applying national or municipal laws because the EEZ provides for limited rights of a
State such as the exclusive rights to explore, exploit and conserve natural resources
which may be found in the waters and the seabed of the EEZ. In such case, it seems
that piracy can be covered by national or municipal laws when the crime is
committed in internal waters while international law covers the act of piracy in the
high seas. However, based on Article 101 of UNCLOS, the act of piracy seems not
included in the EEZ.
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The term “high seas” as it refers to piracy in Article 101, seems to be a
misnomer which the authors of the 1982 UNCLOS failed to address. Instead of
changing the word “high seas” as it applies to piracy, the authors clarified the matter
by virtue of Article 58(2) (Appendix C) which states that “articles 88 to 115 and
other pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive economic zone in so
far as they are not incompatible with the other provisions of this Convention.”
Article 58(2) therefore clarifies the issue that when referring to the definition of
piracy in Article 100, piracy can be committed as well in the exclusive economic
zone.
To further confuse the issue, Article 101(a)(ii) mentions that piracy can be
committed “in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State.” But the state maintains
jurisdiction to a certain extent in the exclusive economic zone. But Article 58(2)
clarifies that piracy can be committed as well in the EEZ. Hence, the phrase “outside
the jurisdiction” in the definition of piracy in international law only means outside
the territorial sea.
It would have been judicious for the authors of the 1982 UNCLOS to avoid
such misinterpretation by just stating that piracy is committed outside territorial
waters of a State rather than mentioning the high seas.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, it would seem, based on statistics, that majority of
modern day piracy incidents occur in territorial waters thereby excluding them from
the definition of piracy in international law. The reason for its exclusion is because
territorial waters of a coastal State are subject to the sovereignty and exclusive
jurisdiction of that State where national or municipal law applies. Such exclusion
has given rise to problems particularly when developing countries do not have
sufficient resources to fight piracy. Pirates tend to commit piracy attacks and then
hide or seek “refuge” in territorial waters where they know that such State does not
have the means and resources to apprehend them.

This problem is further

exacerbated by the doctrine of hot pursuit in Article 111 of UNCLOS (Appendix C)
which provides that a State can exercise the right of hot pursuit against a pirate ship
only if such pursuit commences in its territorial waters and may extend to the high
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seas only if such pursuit remains uninterrupted. In any case, such pursuit ceases
when the pirate ship enters the territorial waters of another State. Take the case of
piracy incidents in the Malacca Straits which lies within the jurisdiction of three
States, namely, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. A piracy incident may occur in
the territorial waters of Singapore where Singapore authorities have the means and
resources to combat piracy. However, a pirate ship can quickly seek refuge in
neighboring Indonesia where Singapore authorities cannot exercise the right of hot
pursuit and where Indonesian authorities do not have sufficient means and capability
to apprehend these pirates.
It seems that to solve the problem, the definition of piracy should not be
limited to the high seas criterion but should include territorial waters. Some authors
contend that such cannot be done because no State would allow an encroachment on
its sovereignty when another State pursues a pirate ship in the territorial sea of
another State.
This author believes that there is a remedy to the issues raised. International
laws are made because of a collective agreement between States. By being a
signatory to an international instrument, a State is obliged to follow provisions as
contained in such instrument. National laws are in fact created and amended to suit
international law. In time, international law becomes customary law when majority
of the States accept an international law as their own national law. To define piracy
so as to include acts committed in territorial waters is not an infringement of
sovereignty of a State. If this was the case, then how come international conventions
are made mandatory to States who have ratified such instrument and incorporated
such convention in their national laws? This is not considered as an infringement on
a State’s sovereignty when such convention provides regulations for vessels and
crew of a particular state. This author does believes that just as States periodically
surrender certain specific rights when they ratify treaties, so should they be able to
also agree to defining an illegal act as piracy even when the same is committed in, or
close to, territorial waters.
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International law only defines what a piracy act is, irregardless of boundaries,
so as to provide uniformity.

This is precisely why the doctrine of hot pursuit

mentions that the pursuit ceases upon the entry of a pirate ship into the territorial
waters of another State. While Article 100 mentions the duty of each State to
cooperate in the repression of piracy, it does not allow a State to intrude in another
State’s territorial waters without the permission of that State.
International law has universal jurisdiction; yet, it fails when it limits the
definition of piracy as acts committed in the high seas. The universality principle
ceases to operate when majority of piracy acts are in fact committed in territorial
waters. The national law of a State may differ from the national law of another State
in the treatment of the act of “piracy” in territorial waters. The solution would
therefore be that to achieve the universality principle, a collective agreement between
all States should be made to achieve uniformity.

This can only be done by

re-defining piracy in international law so as to include acts in territorial waters.
IMO has consistently said that the Malacca Straits is a piracy prone area. Yet,
the Malacca Straits is within the territorial limits of three countries. Further, IMO
also tries to classify piracy and armed robbery. Yet, it solves the problem of piracy
and armed robbery as if it were one and the same concept. The fact remains that the
illegal act of violence, detention or depredation against a ship is considered as piracy
in international law as well as national law, irregardless of where the crime is
committed. It is in fact beneficial if all national laws of all States are based on
international law for uniformity in definition, enforcement and prosecution of acts of
piracy both in territorial waters and in the high seas.
5.2 Root Cause of Piracy
Perhaps the best solution to overcome all types of problems relating to piracy is
to discern the root cause of the problem or “strike at the root” as the saying goes
before a problem gets out of hand. In the case of modern day piracy, it may not be
that easy to solve the problem by eradicating the root cause.
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5.2.1 Poverty and the Amateur Pirates
As discussed in Chapter 2, most piracy and armed robbery incidents occur in
territorial waters.

Piracy hotspots in East Asia to include the Malacca Strait,

Indonesian waters, the waters bordering the Luzon-Hainan-Hong Kong triangle, as
well as the waters in Southern Philippines, belong to developing or underdeveloped
countries or countries whose great majority are the poor, some of who resort to crime
for their subsistence. The economic situation prevailing in the region seems to be an
underlying reason why piracy flourishes in the area. Piracy in these areas are mostly
perpetrated by small fishermen who are stricken by poverty and have thus resorted to
piracy acts to sustain their livelihood.

Needless to say, incidents of piracy

perpetrated by these people are not of a magnitude that harms the shipping
community for reasons that goods, valuables, ship’s equipment lost to these pirates
are relatively minimal in terms of value. Furthermore, this type of pirates do not
usually confront the crew as they are usually armed only with knives and small
firearms, and therefore, the intention to steal is of primary concern. Resorting to
armed confrontation with intention to rob, to harass the crew or to commit murder,
would be incidental. Although piracy attacks committed by this type of pirates are of
less value to the shipping community, the frequency of such attacks cannot be
discounted.
Poverty as a root cause is hard to eliminate because there are so many factors
to consider, with piracy being the least among them. It is an inherent problem in
areas of developing countries and piracy is just one of so many problems associated
with poverty. To eradicate poverty is not an easy task. Poverty alleviation would
mean the improvement of a State’s economy through infrastructure, transportation,
communications, social security, education, and other major areas affecting poverty.
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Thus, poverty as a root cause in piracy can only be eradicated through time and
through economic prosperity which is an impossible task as a short-term solution.

5.2.2 Organized Syndicates or Professional Pirates
In contrast to poverty which is one of the root causes of piracy that cannot be
easily solved, the presence of organized syndicates as a root cause can be eradicated.
As discussed in Chapter 2, piracy syndicates have been prevalent in Asia. Such
syndicates are not limited by national boundaries as they are well connected to other
organizations in other countries. Take the case of the hijacking of the MT Tabangao
tanker in the Philippines in 1991. This vessel was hijacked in connivance with the
master and was converted into a phantom vessel. Government authorities were later
able to trace the renamed vessel which was plying between Indonesia and Singapore.
The capture of the suspected pirate revealed that this incident was only one of five
other incidents perpetrated by the same group. The conversion of a pirated vessel
into a phantom ship with papers of registration that look as genuine as those issued
by authorities would mean that this syndicate had connections with corrupt
government authorities in order for them to get hold of registration papers of an
unknown name.

Furthermore, a vessel pirated from one country can be easily

registered and reflagged to another country which would indicated that this syndicate
had members all around Asia for them to conduct their business elsewhere such as in
Singapore and Indonesia. For example, some flag states or open registries offer
temporary registration of ownership of a vessel with no questions asked as long as
the fee for registration is paid.
Another factor to consider is the selling of pirated cargo. Usually, cargoes are
worth more than the ship. Syndicates have been known to pirate a vessel, convert the
vessel into a phantom ship by renaming and furnishing it with falsified registration
papers and certificates from another country, and then selling the cargo to
unscrupulous buyers of yet another country. This was the case in the hijacking of
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MV Alondra Rainbow which was hijacked in 1999 as she sailed from Indonesia to
Japan. The said vessel was able to change its name to Mega Rama flying the Belize
flag. After her capture by the Indian navy as she sailed in the Arabian Sea, it was
discovered that $4.5M worth of aluminum ingots were sold/discharged in either
Thailand or Cambodia.
The problem with the sale of stolen cargo is that cargoes can be legitimately
sold to as many persons by just the passing of hands of a bill of lading, even during
the transit of the cargo. What was originally cargo destined for a certain consignee
reflected in the bill of lading can be easily sold to another person or multitude of
persons by just passing on the bill of lading. What is difficult to trace is the fact that
no written document is necessary to transfer a bill of lading to another person.
Further, a bill of lading can be easily forged so as to make it appear that it is the
original bill of lading intended to a rogue buyer of stolen cargo.
Perhaps the best way to eradicate piracy syndicates is to deny them the access
of selling a vessel and its cargo. An honest shipping owner or a buyer of stolen
cargo should know better than to buy something of lesser value that its intended
commodity price. When a syndicate sells a vessel or its cargo at a lower price that its
present market value, the intended buyer should already be suspicious and should
conduct his own investigation before buying such vessel or cargo. This may not be
the case with unscrupulous buyers who desire only to make profit, irregardless if
such was done illegally.
A shipping owner, for example, should be held criminally liable if he buys a
vessel without conducting a proper check with concerned authorities. A buyer of
cargo should check on the bill of lading before buying stolen cargo to make sure that
the said cargo is indeed intended for legal sale to him. One good method in checking
the legitimacy of a cargo is to check the Certificate of Origin. A Certificate of Origin
is a document required by some but not all countries to determine the manufacturer
of a product for export and determine where the product originated (Appendix D).
This Certificate may be forged by syndicates. However, this can be the best way for
a buyer to check the origins and legitimacy of the cargo before buying it from the

58

syndicate. While a Bill of Lading is regulated by international regulations, a
Certificate of Origin depends only on the custom regulations of the importing
country. It is because of its advantage in tracing a cargo that it should be a mandatory
requirement in world trade. The World Trade Organization (WTO) can best address
this issue.
An unscrupulous buyer of stolen cargo should also be held criminally liable if
he buys stolen cargo without conducting the necessary checks provided by law.
Higher punishment as provided by law can deter the would-be buyer from buying
stolen cargo.
To prevent the syndicate from freely selling a vessel and its cargo is a daunting
task that needs the full cooperation of all States. This can only be achieved through
regional or international cooperation which will be discussed later in the Chapter.
5.3 Preventive Measures and Countermeasures for Ships
This author does not intend to discuss and provide new measures and
countermeasures for ships in preventing piracy as there are a magnitude of
recommended measures provided by countless organizations such as IMO, IMB,
BIMCO (Shipmaster’s Security Manual), ICS (Pirates and Armed Robbers A
Master’s Guide), to name a few.

Perhaps the most recent among these

recommendations is the IMO MSC/Circ. 623/Rev. 1 pertaining to the Guidance to
Shipowners and Ship Operators, Shipmasters and Crews on Preventing and
Suppressing Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships which provides for
steps to be taken by the shipowner and crew to reduce the risk of piracy attacks, and
appropriate responses to an attack.
Most important among these recommendations is the establishment of a ship
security plan that would contain the recommendations given by these organizations.
Instead, this section would rather focus on recommendations that are either obviously
highly advantageous or, in the opinion of others, totally outrageous.
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5.3.1 Reporting Piracy
Under-reporting has been a problem that has prevented authorities from
analyzing piracy incidents in the region so as to provide a better understanding of the
problem. Under-reporting also hampers the repression of piracy because government
agencies cannot react on a specific piracy incident. As discussed in Chapter 2, at
least one half of all piracy incidents are not reported for various reasons usually
connected to perceived advantages to the shipowner.
IMO Circular 623 Rev. 1 provides for the format of reporting a piracy attack to
authorities. Further, reports have to be directed to the nearest Rescue Coordination
Center and to the IMB Piracy Reporting Center for proper coordination and response
of government authorities concerned. Yet, in most piracy incidents, the vessel’s
master alerts the ship owners first to seek guidance rather than the concerned
authorities in the event of a piracy attack.

Unless we persuade shipowners to

collectively support the drive against piracy by reporting piracy incidents to the
proper authorities, the enforcement against piracy will continue to suffer.
5.3.2 Firearms On Board
The IMO and the IMB discourage the use and carriage of firearms on board
vessels. IMO Circular 623 states that the carriage of firearms on board encourage
attackers to carry firearms thereby escalating an already dangerous situation.
Furthermore, the use of firearms require special training. But all modern piracy
incidents today are carried out by armed attackers. If so, then firearms on board does
not encourage attackers who already have weapons such as knives, pistols and even
sophisticated firearms in the first place.
Today, the carriage of firearms, although not recommended by IMO, depends
on the vessel’s registry and port of destination. Some States have allowed the
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carriage of firearms onboard the vessel and secured by the Master. Yet other States
do not allow vessels entering their port to carry onboard firearms, or if such vessels
do have firearms onboard, these firearms are secured by port authorities or allowed
to be kept on board on a locked location.
To overcome the anxiety caused by the carriage of firearms on board a vessel
and IMO’s recommendation that firearms offer an attractive target for an attacker, a
shipowner can, for example, require her vessels to employ additional crew such as a
security officer or security guards when the said vessel sails on piracy prone areas or
provide for special training on the use of firearms by a specific member of the crew
such as the chief mate or master.
The carriage of firearms onboard a vessel remains controversial and therefore,
it is up to the shipowner, the State of registry, or the port authorities, to recommend
or allow the carriage of firearms. It remains controversial in view of the fact that it is
widely perceived that the carriage of firearms may not act as a deterrent to piracy
attacks. Further, there have been organized piracy attacks that are perpetrated by
heavily armed pirates against which the crews are no match.
Pirates generally prefer vessels that appear to be easy prey. Yet, a trained crew
or the use of additional crew such as security officers or guards who have special
training on the use of firearms and ways to combat piracy might be a better option
than being defenseless against these attackers. A simple analogy to this theory is that
companies such as banks, jewelry stores, large companies or any other business
companies who need to protect their interests hire security agencies to provide
security guards. As in the case of a bank with security guards, the interest is to
provide a deterrent but when a robbery gang decides to rob a bank with as much
firepower as to overcome the security guards, then and only then can the security
guards decide not to fight to protect the safety of the people inside the bank. The
presence of security guards in a bank did not “escalate a dangerous situation” as
referred to by IMO when firearms or resistance to pirates are done. A shipping
company is also one such company where the shipowner has to protect not only his
interest, that is the ship, but also the cargo and its crew. A defenseless crew needs to
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be protected. The provision on security guards, despite being minimal as not to
provide adequate resistance to heavily armed pirates, is, just like in any other
company, a deterrent no matter how small that deterrent may be.
When the policy of a shipowner is not to resist attackers in order to avoid the
risk of an escalation of violence, ships tend to be easy targets for piracy and are
willful victims of piracy even though the piracy act has not yet been consummated.
Having a passive attitude to the piracy problem may be a factor on the proliferation
of piracy attacks since pirates know that ships offer no resistance at all.
Other options other than firearms are available in the market. Private security
firms market a range of security equipment designed to detect or deter intruders, such
as infrared detector alarms, detachable barbed wires and tear gas canisters. While
IMO does not recommend the carriage of firearms onboard, it doesn’t provide any
recommendation or guidelines on other security equipment.
5.3.3 Hiring Commercial Anti-Piracy Services
To fill in the lack of enforcement provided by maritime authorities in the fight
against piracy mainly because of insufficient resources, some companies are cashing
in on the need for anti-piracy services by offering the services of professionally
qualified people who are former military personnel, anti-terrorist soldiers or
mercenaries. There are a number of specialized security companies dealing with
anti-piracy, most notably, Anglo Marine Overseas Services, Marine Risk
Management, Satellites Protection Services and International Maritime Security, who
offer training as well as the use of ex-military personnel and anti-terrorist personnel.
One company, for example, offers the use of former British Army Gurkha soldiers.
Further, some companies provide more services such as post piracy actions. Marine
Risk Management (MRM) also provides other services such as the recovery of ships
and cargoes and the rescue of crew victims of pirate attacks (Lloyd’s, 1999).
As with the carriage of firearms onboard, the use of commercial anti-piracy
services remains controversial. Proponents believe that the use of professional anti-
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piracy services is a good deterrent against piracy while others believe that the use of
armed resistance might further escalate a piracy attack to the detriment of the crew.
A burden to the shipowner is the added cost it would take to hire a commercial
anti-piracy service. The cost of professional services could reach up to $1,500 per
day for each security personnel hired. While this author believes that firearms
onboard might be a good option as long as steps are taken to secure such firearms
and training and supervision are required for the handling of such firearms, the use of
commercial anti-piracy service might be a grossly overrated solution where the
motive is set entirely on profit for such companies offering these type of services.
As mentioned earlier, an alternative is the use of security officers or security guards
such as those used in cruise ships and passenger liners or specialized training on key
crews such as the master and chief mate in the use of firearms. IMO MSC Circular
623 Rev. 1 provides a recommendation to shipowners to consider enhancing security
watches when their ship is in piracy prone waters. While IMO does not recommend
the carriage of firearms aboardship, it seems contradictory to the above
recommendation when IMO recommends the use of security watches. A shipowner
will, for example, based on the above IMO recommendation, hire a security agency
to provide a ship security officer plus around two security guards who will act as
security watches when the ship travels through piracy prone waters.
While there are a number of conflicting views for or against the use of
commercial anti-piracy services, shipping industry sources predict a rising trend in
the use of such services primarily because of the increasing cost related to the loss of
one ship due to piracy. It is the opinion of this author that while the hiring of such
specialized security services as IMO believes, “can escalate an already dangerous
situation”, it would still be a rather good deterrent. However, such use can entail
larger costs to the shipowner who might realize that such added cost was an
overreaction on their part when other alternatives such as the use of security guards
and a security officer from an ordinary security agency, i.e. those provided in
passenger liners, or the training of a specific crew in security matters as well as the
handling of firearms, can provide the same measure of deterrent.
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5.3.4 Tracking Devices
The International Maritime Bureau (IMB), in collaboration with the Collecte
Localisation Satellites, a world leading satellite tracking system operator, announced
the availability of a ship tracking system, SHIPLOC, beginning in 1999. This antipiracy or anti-hijack ship tracking system is a satellite-linked equipment that enables
the shipowner to keep track of a vessel’s location via the use of the internet. The
SHIPLOC transmitter is firstly installed aboardship in a hidden location that is not
revealed to the crew for their protection. There have been instances where piracy
cases were actually frauds committed by shipowners who make bogus insurance
claims. As such, the transmitter’s location can also be left unknown to the shipowner
with the intention that the shipowner is informed of consequences when the location
of the transmitter is divulged.
The principle of the SHIPLOC is similar to the anti-theft device used in the
United States for private and commercial vehicles where a vehicle tracking device is
installed to provide the location of a stolen vehicle.
SHIPLOC is a relatively inexpensive equipment that uses a computer and an
internet connection with a low monthly rental of between US$150 and US$310. This
author believes that SHIPLOC is a revolutionary development in the campaign
against piracy. The system is recommended by the IMB which is at the forefront in
the fight against piracy. In fact, it is the only equipment officially endorsed by IMB.
Other commercial transmitters or tracking devices such as the Ship Trac offered by
the Marine Risk Management company, are also available in the market today but do
not offer the same advantage as the inexpensive SHIPLOC system. The primary
concern of a shipowner is cost and when one system is comparable with the other at
a much lower cost to the shipowner, then the shipowner will tend to elect the more
economical alternative. Perhaps, the greatest disadvantage is that there are a lot of
commercial vessel tracking devices available in the market today and therefore, it is
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up to the shipowner to decide which device to use as long as the said device provides
the purpose of tracking a vessel.
The use of SHIPLOC provides a good deterrent against piracy. According to
IMB Director Captain Pottengal Mukundan, "the fact that ships may have this
device on board will concern the pirates because they will know that someone
outside could know exactly where the ship is. And obviously, if a vessel with the
device is actually hijacked, its position will be known to its owners and subsequently
to law enforcement agencies." This deterrent can only be realized if all ships are
fitted with this device or similar device. Perhaps a concerted effort, with the IMO
providing the necessary regulation requiring the installation of this device or any
other similar device with the same capability on board all ships, is the solution. With
all ships carry a tracking device, pirates will think twice before hijacking a vessel
since they will know that their activity can be monitored and passed on to the
concerned law enforcement agency thereby increasing the likelihood of
apprehension.
5.4 Problems of Enforcement
5.4.1 Pursuit of Pirates
One major constraint encountered in the conduct of enforcement against piracy
is when a pirate ship flee into the territorial sea of another State after committing the
crime of piracy on the high seas or in the territorial waters of another State. Under
Article 111 of UNCLOS the right of hot pursuit ends when a pirate ship has entered
the territorial waters of another state. Additionally, Article 105 does not allow the
seizure of a pirate ship by a foreign warship within the territorial sea of another State
without the consent of that State. The underlying reason for such limitation is that a
foreign warship that enters into the territorial waters of another State may constitute
an infringement of that State’s sovereignty. Article 105 and Article 111 are therefore
absolute and unconditional. However, due consent and approval may be given by a

65

State to allow a foreign warship to seize a pirate ship in the territorial waters of that
State on a case to case basis, i.e., when that State deems it necessary to seek the
assistance of another State in the apprehension of the pirates because of lack of
resources. In the spirit of Article 100 where all states are encouraged to cooperate in
the repression of piracy, a pursuing foreign warship can request the State to which
the pirates has fled, to allow them to continue their pursuit against the pirate ship or
seek the consent and assistance of that State.
One possible solution to the problem of seizure of a pirate ship when it enters
the territorial waters of another state is through bilateral or multilateral agreements
between neighboring states.
5.4.2 Resource Constraint
An effective enforcement against piracy involves sufficient means and
resources for responding to piracy attacks. The inability of some States to effect a
timely response against pirates may be traced to the lack of resources and
infrastructure to combat piracy. An anti-piracy infrastructure and operational system
should be in place.

Infrastructure includes the organizational set-up involving

agencies that should respond to a piracy incident and resources needed in the
enforcement measure such as navy vessels, manpower and communication networks.
An effective operational system involves procedures in responding to attacks such as
the creation of a rescue coordination center.
Most developing countries, however, lack the resources to fight piracy. The
Philippines, for example, has a good organizational set-up and a system that will
provide for early response to piracy incidents reported to the rescue coordination
center. This set-up is good in paper as it is properly documented. The vital element
to a good piracy response, which are the needed resources such as vessels and
communications, is lacking. In 1996, the Philippine government announced that
piracy is a threat to the economic development of the country and is included in the
long-term development of the navy. As such, the navy embarked on a 22-year

66

modernization and expansion program. This long term planning and vision later was
sidelined when the needed funds of about $12B did not materialize.
Piracy rarely occur in maritime areas of industrialized countries, if not
minimal. It is due to the fact that industrialized countries such as the United States
have the resources to respond to incidents. They have the air and sea resources to
carry out the mission of pursuing pirates. This is a powerful deterrent when the
pirates consider that there is minimal chance for them to escape.
Concerns of resource constraints in the fight against piracy in the Malacca
Strait have brought forward recommended solutions. Japan which has considered the
loss of or blockade of needed imported oil from the Persian Gulf a national security
matter, has offered and proposed the use of Japanese ships for joint patrols with other
law enforcement vessels in the Malacca Strait. While others see such proposal as a
step to fill in the gap of needed resources, some are threatened by the fact that Japan
might play a greater security role in Asia and the thoughts of Japanese colonial and
wartime occupation might lead to the rise of Japan not only as an economic power
but as a military power as well. Yet another recommended solution is to provide for
a regional coast guard body composed of different coast guard agencies that would
conduct patrols in the Strait. Some even recommended the creation of a UN task
force to fight piracy in the Strait.

While all these recommendations solve the

problem of resource constraints, other issues such as political jurisdiction have yet to
be answered. The fact remains that in order to overcome resource constraints in the
fight against piracy, the help of developing countries to provide the needed resources
is needed, as well as regional and international cooperation for joint enforcement
response.

5.4.3 Regional or International Cooperation
In 1990, the Philippine government was able to trace nine piracy/hijacking
incidents to a Singapore firm named Ten Tac Ltd. The company participated in
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negotiations for the sale of one of the missing vessels at the port of Kao-hsiung,
Taiwan and that another was sold by the company for scrap in Pusan, Republic of
Korea. The Philippine government was virtually helpless as the incident involved a
company outside its jurisdiction, namely, a Singapore company. Evidence to secure
the apprehension of company officials, may not be admissible by Singapore
authorities as the evidence were taken from other States, such as Taiwan where a
vessel was sold, and Republic of Korea where a vessel was scrapped. Further, the
lack of cooperation including the exchange of information between law enforcement
agencies of countries affected have further exacerbated the problem (IMO, 2000).
The most effective method in the enforcement against piracy is the willing
coordination between governments to provide an all out response or concerted
response against piracy when one State needs the assistance of another. In addition,
when piratical attacks occur within regional boundaries where attackers flee to
another country for refuge, regional international agreements are needed. This is
perhaps the most effective and least controversial method in combating piracy that
has gained worldwide acceptance. The Philippines and Indonesia, for example,
permitted the “encroachment” of navy vessels only for purposes of search and rescue
after a permission is granted by the other State. In the Malacca Strait, Indonesia,
Malaysia and Singapore conducted joint sea patrols in 1993 against piracy. This was
not followed up because of the expensive use of naval and air resources.
Regional agreements are needed to facilitate a coordinated response to piracy
attacks. In 1999, IMO initiated seminars in Asia and South America to discuss the
piracy situation and consider countermeasures to be taken. One of the objectives of
the seminar is to impress among the attending states the need for developing regional
cooperation agreements between neighboring countries for coordinated patrols as
well as other appropriate measures that may include enhanced cooperation in the
arrest and prosecution of pirates.

MSC Circular 622 Rev. 1 on Guidance to

Shipowners and Ship Operators, Shipmasters and Crews on Preventing and
Suppressing Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships which was a result of
the conclusions made in the two seminars mentioned above now contains
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recommendations on how to deal with piracy, including the establishment of regional
agreements to facilitate a coordinated response to piracy attacks.

The revised

Circular further provides a draft agreement which can be used by neighboring states
so as to provide uniformity among regional agreements.
In Southeast Asia, regional institutions such as the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the
Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific should include in their
agenda efforts to minimize if not eradicate piracy through regional cooperation.
While regional cooperation is the best alternative to coordinate responses to
piracy attacks, this author believes that regional cooperation is a short term solution
when international cooperation does not exist.

The lack of uniformity in the

understanding of piracy between nations still exists. One country differs in opinion
to another in terms of jurisdiction, enforcement, prosecution, punishment and the
interpretation of piracy in international law. The limitation of regional cooperation is
that piracy incidents that occur along or within two countries where regional
cooperation exists, does not take into consideration nationalities of vessels involved
in the piracy incident and therefore the views and perception of the offended
nationality, i.e. the victim vessel, may differ from those of the countries where the
piracy incident took place. For example, a piracy incident in the Malacca Strait
involving the cooperation of three countries does not take into consideration the view
of the flag state for which the vessel is registered. While UNCLOS provides that the
state that effects the seizure of the pirates may prosecute the pirates, the flag state
might insist that it is in the best interest that the flag state prosecutes the pirate since
they are the offended party. The ambiguity of law, especially when the law uses the
word “may” as to mean that it is up to the discretion of a party to follow such law or
not, leaves countries in a quandary when the law is not absolute. Therefore, there is
a limit to regional cooperation in that it still does not provide for international
acceptance and uniformity of actions taken as regards to piracy.

International

cooperation is thus the ultimate objective. This can only happen when there exists
uniformity in the interpretation of international law.
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The IMO can spearhead

mandatory regulations as regards to piracy by instituting conventions on piracy. A
first step being undertaken is the creation of a code for investigations on piracy
which is being discussed in the Maritime Safety Committee. However, investigation
is just one of numerous other problems that IMO should also address, such as, piracy
definition in international law, enforcement, jurisdiction, prosecution and
punishment.
5.5 Investigation, Prosecution and Punishment
5.5.1 Article 105 of UNCLOS
Article 105 of UNCLOS states that upon seizure of a pirate ship, “the courts of
the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed,
and may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or
property, subject to the rights of third parties in good faith.” In other words, the
prosecution and punishment of piracy “may” depend on the state that carried out the
arrest and their municipal laws. This may be varied from state to state. Penalties
may differ with one state prescribing the capital punishment of death or reclusion
perpetua while another state may just prescribe limited imprisonment. This problem
is even more prevalent when piracy acts are committed by criminal syndicates who
know that they can get away with the crime of piracy if they flee to a state that
prescribes a lesser punishment or moreso, when no punishment at all is provided in
national or municipal laws.
Further to the problem of interpretation of Article 105, the use of the word
“may” means that a state that makes the arrest decides whether the pirates shall be
prosecuted under their national laws.

The offended party might feel that their

interests cannot be met by the state prosecuting the pirates. The state that carries out
the seizure of pirates and decides to prosecute them might find it hard to institute the
maximum penalty when the offended party is not even a national of the state whose
laws are for the protection of its nationals only. The SUA Convention provides a
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clearer and more assertive guideline in the prosecution of an offender because it
provides for the option to extradite or to prosecute an offender. Still, the decision is
left to the apprehending state. And when an apprehending state does not have the
right laws that can provide the maximum penalty to offenders, the offended party is
left with no choice; and the flag state which may have stricter laws and which
protects the rights of the offended party, cannot demand the extradition of the
offenders.
To overcome this problem, it is clear that the international law on piracy should
be revised so as to provide the necessary protection on the interests of the flag state
as well.
5.5.2 Legislation
National laws differ from state to state. Some states do not even have laws
concerning piracy.

When national laws on piracy does exist, they need to be

strengthened.
When laws on piracy including punishment differs from state to state, the effort
on enforcement as discussed above becomes futile.

A coordinated legislation

between states would mean that pirates have no place to hide or seek refuge when
they know that their piracy act carry the same punishment no matter what state he
seeks refuge. Aggressive action against piracy includes the commitment by states to
punish pirates with utmost impunity, providing for higher punishments and penalties.
When the crime of piracy is meted by life imprisonment or death, it becomes an
effective deterrent against piracy. There should be strong commitment and political
will among all states in the fight against piracy.
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5.5.3 Code for Piracy Investigation
The IMO Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) in its seventy-first session in
May 1999 discussed the outcome of two missions sent to South America and
Southeast Asia to find out the situation and measures taken by States in the area. The
committee concluded that there is a need for more effective action in apprehending
and prosecuting pirates. This conclusion was based on the premise that there exists
the absence of effective procedures in some countries for investigating cases of
piracy.

While the act of piracy is committed at sea, the investigation process

includes investigation in land including the pursuit of pirates by local law
enforcement agencies or international agencies such as Interpol. The MSC agreed to
develop a draft Code for the investigation of cases involving piracy in order to have a
common approach to the investigation of cases and to promote cooperation between
States in the course of investigations. The draft Code will also recommend the
appropriate punishment for the crime of piracy so as to provide uniformity.
It is hoped that the draft Code will solve and provide a uniform or unified
procedure to the problem related to investigation, criminal jurisdiction and
prosecution of piracy acts as well as recommending an appropriate punishment for
the crime of piracy. In the meantime that the draft Code has not been finalized, IMO
recommends and urges member states to ratify the 1988 Rome Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation or the
SUA Convention which was discussed in Chapter 4. This Convention, although
deals more on maritime terrorism, provides guidance on matters of investigation,
criminal jurisdiction and prosecution.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

From the discussions and analysis presented in the preceding chapters, modern
day piracy is indeed an aggravating problem in the world of sea transport today.
From historical piracy dating back to as early as 1200 BC to present or modern day
piracy, acts of piracy have remained an enigma that needs to be addressed lest it
becomes a continuous problem in the future thereby affecting the economical
viability of marine transport vis-à-vis other modes of transport.
The problems related to piracy is onerous and involves a lot of factors, each of
which have to be addressed if piracy is to be eradicated in the future. The analysis
presented in the preceding chapters suggest the following conclusions and
recommendations:
Modern day piracy differs from historical piracy.
Piracy dates back to as early as 1200 BC and has changed in concept
depending on the situation at that period in time. Piracy at that time was termed in
many different ways such as privateering, buccaneers and corsairs. The act of piracy
in historical times did not at all occasions represent an illegal act as in the case of
privateers who were commissioned by a country to harass the enemy’s merchant
fleet. The method used in eradicating piracy during the eighteenth and nineteenth
century involved the outlawing of privateers who once enjoyed the protection of a
State, as contained in the Declaration of Paris and the Second Hague Convention.
Modern day piracy is a totally different activity compared to historical piracy.
The act of plundering still exists but the purpose of piracy, such as poverty
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alleviation and syndicated crime, differs from historical piracy. Yet, we continue to
tackle the problem of modern day piracy based on laws that existed to tackle
historical piracy. The Geneva Convention and UNCLOS 1982 were created when
the act of piracy committed by professional syndicates was not even rampant at that
time. To eradicate modern day piracy, therefore, involves the formulation of new
international laws that can deal with the present situation of piracy.
Piracy in Southeast Asia has seen increasing incidence.
This dissertation focuses on piracy in Southeast Asia because that is where the
majority of piracy incidents occur today. As much as 60% occur in Southeast Asia,
specifically in high risk areas such as the Strait of Malacca, the Hong Kong-LuzonHainan Triangle, parts of the South China Sea, Gulf of Thailand, seaways of
Indonesia and Malaysia as well as seaways in Southern Philippines. Further to
having the most number of piracy incidents, the region also experienced an alarming
increase in incidence from 96 incidents in 1998 to 165 incidents in 1999. Inasmuch
as the great majority of incidents occur in Southeast Asia, this region can be used as
a yardstick in determining the problems associated with piracy and analyzing the best
way to solve these problems.
There is a need to change the definition of piracy in international law (piracy
iure gentium) to cope with the problems associated with present day piracy.
The 1958 Geneva Convention and the 1982 UNCLOS failed in providing a
definition of piracy in international law that meets the requirements of all signatories.
The definition of piracy in quite a number of national laws differ from the
international convention definition. This definition also fails to address the problem
of modern day piracy.
The term “any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depradation”
should address the issues on magnitude and gravity of the offense in order to be
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classified as piracy and the distinction between robbery and piracy by providing for a
necessary element of a pirate taking control of a vessel.
The term “committed for private ends” should address the issue of the status of
insurgents who differ from belligerents because the latter is covered by laws of war.
The criterion on “for private ends” failed to take into account that vessels of today
are hard to classify as that from a “neutral state” because a vessel may be registered
and flagged in one country, the owner is from another country, and the crew and
passengers belong to different nationalities.

Furthermore, modern day piracy

involves actions of insurgents who hide under the cloak of political motives to justify
actions which otherwise would not in any way constitute a political act but rather
illegal acts of murder, robbery, rape, kidnap for ransom, and extortion. In order to
address these issues, the “private ends” criterion should be removed from the
definition of piracy in international law.
The term “by the crew or passengers of a private ship…and directed…against
another ship, or against persons or property on board such ship” or the two-ship
criterion may have been a result of historical piracy where the act of piracy was only
committed by a pirate ship against another vessel. The situation today is that more
and more illegal acts of violence are in fact committed by the crew or passengers of a
vessel. Some countries have in fact decided to deviate from the international law
definition because they believe that how an offender arrives aboard a victim ship is
not necessarily relevant as long as their purpose is to seize the ship by use or threat of
violence. In differentiating an act of mutiny from an act of piracy, the act of taking
control of the vessel by means of an unlawful act as described earlier should be a
necessary element.
The term “on the high seas” or “in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State”
fails to address the problem that without this criterion, most acts of piracy are in fact
perpetrated in territorial waters. While the international law on piracy is supposed to
provide for the universality principle, it fails in doing so because most piracy
incidents today occur in territorial waters outside the present jurisdiction of piracy in
international law. UNCLOS 1982 uses the term “high seas” in the definition of
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piracy, and yet includes the exclusive economic zone in certain instances which
makes the document more difficult to understand when referring to specific articles
on piracy. Incidents in the Strait of Malacca, considered the most piracy prone area,
are in fact not considered piracy in international law because the strait is bordered by
territorial seas of three countries. The use of the “high seas” criterion has been used
by piracy offenders who commits the act of piracy in one State and then seek refuge
in another State.
The International Maritime Organization has tried to solve the problem of
loopholes in the definition of piracy.

The Convention for the Suppression of

Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation or the SUA Convention
which primarily addresses acts of maritime terrorism but could be used as a basis of
solving problems related to jurisdiction and prosecution of offenders, is good only as
a medium term solution because this convention is not entirely for the purpose of
piracy but rather on terrorism.
Taking into consideration the above analysis, this author recommends that the
1982 UNCLOS definition which is identical to the Geneva Convention should be
redefined as follows to suit modern day piracy:
Any illegal acts of violence, detention or depredation, committed by
the crew or passengers of a private watercraft or aircraft who takes
control of the same or another watercraft or aircraft, or against persons
or property on board, on seas within or outside the jurisdiction of a
State.
The salient points of the above recommended definition are:
•

Illegal acts shall have a necessary requirement of the act of taking control
of the vessel so as to distinguish piracy from armed robbery.

•

The term “watercraft” in place of “ship” is used so that indigenous types of
watercraft that are not considered as a ship will be included.

•

The term “for private ends” is removed so as to include actions of
insurgents.
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•

Two-ship requirement is removed so that even passengers and crew can
commit an act of piracy. In such case, mutiny will also be an act of piracy
such as the case in some countries. Further, commercial acts such as
barratry will as well be considered as piracy.

•

The high seas requirement is removed so as to include acts of piracy in
territorial waters.

Measures should be in place to deny the pirate from selling a pirated ship or its
cargo.
The best deterrence to piracy is to prevent a piracy act from happening by
denying the pirate, especially pirate syndicates, any form of profitability from the
sale of a pirated ship or its cargo. Stricter penalties or even criminal liability should
be an international standard for unscrupulous buyers of pirated ships and stolen
cargoes who have failed to conduct a proper check with concerned authorities to
determine legitimacy of the transaction. International commitment should be in
place to eradicate the use of forged documents or the issuance of registration papers
to pirated vessels.

As for stolen cargo, the Certificate of Origin should be a

mandatory requirement in maritime trade.
The recommendations on preventing the sale of a pirated ship or its conversion
to a phantom ship can be dealt with through an international forum such as the
International Maritime Organization. The recommendations on preventing the sale
of stolen cargo can be addressed by the World Trade Organization or any for a
concerned with world trade to provide for the standards in establishing the validity of
the sale of stolen commodities.
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Additional preventive measures and countermeasures for ships should be
undertaken.
IMO has sufficiently provided numerous resolutions and circulars containing
recommendations for shipowners, shipmasters and crews in preventing and
suppressing acts of piracy against ships. In addition, organizations such as IMB,
BIMCO and ICS have also come up with recommendations.

While the

recommendations to actions of the crew are adequate, some recommendations need
further improvement and additional recommendations are needed.
IMO has provided the guidelines for reporting acts of piracy. However, underreporting still exists. IMO should instill amongst all shipowners the need to report
acts of piracy in order to provide for a better analysis of piracy incidents and to help
in the enforcement and prosecution of pirates.
The decision whether to recommend the carriage of firearms on board or not
should be left to the shipowner or the flag state. A master or chief mate trained in the
use of a firearm or better yet, the use of security officers or guards can be a good
deterrent. As in any company whose interests and assets have to be protected, proper
security measures include the judicious use of security guards. A trained crew or
trained security officer knows when to provide resistance against a pirate attack and
when to decide not to offer resistance when the attackers are sufficiently armed to
deter any form of resistance.
This author does not recommend the use of commercial anti-piracy services
that offer specialized anti-piracy skills for an often expensive fee, as it is an overrated
reaction to a problem that can be solved by using ordinary security agencies.
The use of tracking devices should be made a mandatory requirement aboard
vessels. As an optional equipment, it is a good device to use to track a pirated vessel
in order to provide the enforcement response necessary to arrest the pirate and
recover the vessel. As a mandatory equipment, it is a good deterrent against piracy
because pirates will think twice before they pirate a ship when they know that the
ship can be easily tracked and the chances of arrest is high.

78

Regional cooperation should be encouraged but the ultimate objective in
eradicating piracy is through international cooperation.
While efforts are being made to encourage regional cooperation among
neighboring states in the fight against piracy, the problem still remains that states
differ in opinion and interpretation of international law on piracy. Countries with
resource constraints, especially in areas where governments are hard pressed by the
meager resources available in the fight against piracy, need the help of other states.
These states may not necessarily be in the region but developed countries who have
been successful in their enforcement against piracy and who have the resources to
combat piracy. International cooperation is therefore needed as it solves the issue of
uniformity in the interpretation of international law, uniformity in jurisdiction,
uniformity in enforcement response, uniformity in investigation, and uniformity in
legislation and prosecution. This can only be done through an international forum
such as the International Maritime Organization coming as it does under the umbrella
of the United Nations. While there is a need to redefine piracy in international law
by means of amending the 1982 UNCLOS, IMO can take the necessary step in
recommending to the United Nations such amendment. IMO can also come up with
an international convention on piracy that will provide for uniformity in all aspects
related to piracy.
Finally, the problem of piracy cannot be solved by just one solution. There is
no single approach that will solve the problem of piracy as the problem is complex
and involves too many parameters that have to be addressed. It involves numerous
steps required to be taken to overcome the problems related to piracy; a number of
them have been discussed above. Some of the recommendations given may be
considered radical and not easily achieved, such as the revision of the definition of
piracy in international law, but piracy has been with us for centuries and it seems that
radical changes should be made if all States collectively agree that piracy should be

79

eradicated. These recommendations involve a collective agreement amongst all
States since pirates know no boundaries.

They are stateless.

indiscriminately, irregardless of nationality.

They are “hostes humani generis.”

They are enemies of mankind.
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They attack
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APPENDIX A
Extract from
ICC-IMB Annual Report on Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships
Locations of both ACTUAL and ATTEMPTED attacks,
January to December 1991-1999

83

Status of ships during ACTUAL attacks,
January to December 1999

Status of ships during ATTEMPTED attacks,
January to December 1999
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Appendix B
Piracy Report of the Philippine Coast Guard
COUNTRY REPORT ON PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY
ATTACKS AND ANTI-PIRACY ACTIVITIES
I.

INTRODUCTION
The International Maritime Bureau said in its annual report, that pirate attacks
worldwide surged 40 percent in 1999 as economic and political troubles in Indonesia
spurred dramatic increase in Southeast Asia..
Despite her being in Southeast Asia, the Philippines did not go along with the
trend and instead witnessed a decline in piracy by as much as 45 percent.

lI.

PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY SITUATION
A. DEFINITION OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY
WITHIN PHILIPPINE CONTEXT
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea defines piracy in Article
101 as, "(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention or any act of depredation,
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a
private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property
on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a
place outside the jurisdiction of any state; (b) any act of voluntary participation in
the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate
ship or aircraft; (c) any act of making or of intentionally facilitating an act
described in subparagraph (a) or (b)."
Using this definition, piracy is negligible in the country since they did not occur
in the high seas.
Article 132 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines cites two ways or
modes of committing piracy:
1. By attacking or seizing a vessel on the high seas
2. By seizing in the vessel while on the high seas; the whole of part of the cargo,
its equipment or personal belonging of its complement or passengers.
It further gives the elements of piracy as: "1. That a vessel is on the high seas;
2. That the offenders are not members of its complement or passengers of the
vessel; and 3. That the offenders (a) attack or seize that vessel or (b) seize the
whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment or personal belongings of
its complement or passengers."
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The same penal code gives a further meaning of "high sea". It states that "it does
not mean that the crime be committed beyond the three-mile limit of any state. It
means any waters or the sea coast which are without the boundaries of low-water
mark; although such waters may be in the jurisdiction limits of
a foreign government."
As the Supreme Court said in the case of People vs Lol-lo, et.al, 43 Phil, 19, "
now does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile
limit of a foreign state".
Article 123 particularly specifies that "the penalty of from reclusion temporal to
death shall imposed upon those who commit any of the crimes referred to in the
preceding article, under any of the following circumstances: 1) whenever they have
seized a vessel by boarding or firing upon the same; 2) whenever the pirates have
abandoned their victims without means of saving themselves; 3) whenever the
crimes is accompanied by murder, homicide, physical injuries, or rape.
If any of the acts described in Article 122 and/or Article 123 -is committed in
Philippine waters, the same shall be considered as piracy under .Presidential Decree
No. 532. It states that any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of
the whole or part thereof of its cargo, equipment, or the personal belonging of its
complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violations
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person,
including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in Philippine
waters shall be considered as piracy. It is within this context, that the piracy and
armed robbery situation will be based on.
B. NUMBER OF INCIDENTS .
Piracy was at its lowest in 1999 during the last ten years. (Table I). However, this
is not an assurance that the trend will continue although we are happy to note that this
year for the past two months, only three cases have been reported in comparison to 17
last year and 40 in 1997 during the same period. (Table II)
In terms of the monthly average of piracy incidents, from 13 per month in 1996,
it rose to 18 the following year, only to decline to 11 in 1998 and further down to 6
incidents per month last year. (Table II)

86

Table I
Piracy in the last Ten Years
Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

No. of Incidents
80
81
132
175
174
145
142
_ 213
132
72

Growth Chan e
1.25
62
33
-.6
-17
-2
50
-38
-45

T 1 II
Monthly Track of Piracy Incidents
Month
Janu
Febru
March

ril
Ma
June
Jul
Au st
tember
October
November
December

1996
16
14
9
7

1997
19
21
18
9

1998
8
II
18
11

1999
5
12
11
9

5
24
9
6
17
21
8
6

25
37
21
13
13
14
19
4

14
15
11
25
9
7
3
-

15
1

2000
1
2
-

2.
1
3
3
6
4

C. SITES/AREAS OF CONCENTRATION
By island group, majority of the cases occurred in Mindanao for the last
three years although in 1999, Luzon had almost the same total as Mindanao, which only
means that the threat is no longer confined in the latter. (Table III) (see map)
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Table M
Piracy Incidents by Island

G
Luzon
Visa as
Mindanao

1997
62
3
148

1998
42
8
82

1999
28
14
30

In Mindanao, the most affected _ area remains to be Region IX consisting of a
group of provinces stretching from the Zamboanga peninsula to Basilan. (Table IV).
This is because of the region's geographical configuration, thriving barter trade, and
persistent involvement of secessionist groups that purse their piracy activities as
resource-generating measures. .
In Luzon, the NCR, particularly Manila had the most number of piratical
incidents while in the Visayas, there were isolated cases of piracy but of a more
manageable level.
Table IV
'on
1
II
III
IV

IVA
V

VI

VII

Province
Bows Sur
Ilocos Norte
P sinan
Cagayan
Bataan
Zambales
Cavite
Palawan
ezon
Bat as
Occidental Mindoro
Oriental Mindoro
NCR
Sorso on
Camarines Sur
Camarines Norte
Masbate
Ca iz
Iloilo
Aklan
Negros Occidental
Cebu

1997
l
1
1
2
9
3
7
27
3
6
2
2
88

1998
1
1
8
7
1
1
4
19
1
3
1
1

1999
2
3
1
2
2
1
1
1
6
5
1
3
1
2
1
1

VIII

IX
X

XI
ARMM

Biliran
Samar
e
Guimaras
Basilan
Zamboanga del Sur
Zamboanga del Norte
South Cotabato
Saran '
Davao del Sur
Davao Oriental North Cotabato
Sultan Kudarat
Lanao del Norte
Lanao del Sur
indanao
TawiTawi
Sulu I

1
28
41
36
4
9
10
2
1
1
1
1
9
5

2
15
42
2
7
3
1
1
1
9
1

6
2
1
4
9
2
4
5
1
1
I
1
2

-

D. VICTIMS
Prime targets of pirates in Mindanao and the Visayas were fishing boats and
passenger vessels. In Luzon, fishing boats were also prone to attacks although at the
harbor areas like South Harbor, cargo/bulk carriers and other foreign ships were often
preyed upon until pirates shifted their attention to the barges carrying imported wheat
and soya.
E. CONSEQUENCES TO SHIP, CARGO AND CREW
Of the 72 victimized watercraft in 1999, only six of them were taken outright
while the rest were divested of their engines, fishing gears, fish catch and personal
belongings. (Table V)
As for consequences to the crew, the level of violence was on a downtrend
during the last three years from 46 in 1997 to 33 and 14 in the succeeding years. In 1999,
pirates had their share of casualties when sea borne escorts of FB NICOLE fought back
last March I1 in Maasin, Sarangani and when the security escorts of MV MAGNOLIA
EMERALD retaliated last December 3 in the vicinity of Sacol Island, Zamboanga City.
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Table V
Consequences of Piracy for Ship. Cargo & Crew
Consequences
No. of Incidents
No. of Watercraft Pirated
No. of Watercraft Sea jacked
No. of Persons Killed
No. of Persons missing
No. of Persons Wounded -

1997
213
188
25
46
26
31

1998
132
116
16
33
40
15

1999
72
66
6
14
5
2

F. MODUS OPERANDI
Majority of the attacks was of the "low-level" armed robbery type, the most
common form of attack generally carried only in the vicinity. of land from small highspeed craft by groups of petty thieves. They employed the following modus operandi:
1.

Coming alongside a prospective vessel and jumping overboard without
stopping the vessel. Pirates operate swiftly, divesting the engine, fish catch,
cargo and other valuables of their victims. .

2.

Posing as law enforcement agents clad in fatigue uniforms and armed with
high-powered firearms.

3.

Firing at random to scare their victims to submission.

4.

Forcing victims to jump overboard before commandeering said vessel.

5.

Operating in-groups and using more than one vessel so that there would be
a lookout and getaway vessel.

6.

Commandeering a vessel for the purpose of demanding ransom from their
owners/operators.

7.

Using "spotter" or spy vessels to monitor the presence of sea borne patrols.

8.

Establishing strategic checkpoints used in extorting monthly protection
fees and fish catch from fishing boats.
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III.

ANTI-PIRACY ACTIVITIES
Competent national organizations involved in safeguarding our maritime frontiers
from malefactors include the Philippine Navy under the Department of National Defense,
the Philippine National Police- Maritime Group under the Department of Interior and
Local Government, and the Philippine Coast Guard under the Department of
Transportation and Communications.
The Philippine Coast Guard, by virtue of Republic Act 5173 and Executive
Order 477, is mandated to promote safety of life. at sea, safeguard maritime environment
and resources and enforce all applicable maritime laws. As such, the control of piracy is
one of its major concerns.
The Coast Guard is faced with the formidable task of fulfilling a wide mandate
with limited resources available to it. With a 17,600-kilometer coastline - twice longer
that of the United States - and in a country where nearly 70 percent of the population live
or work near marine areas, the PCG has its work cut out for it.
A. STRUCTURE OF THE PCG
The PCG has a line and staff form of organization with the Commandant at the
helm providing direction, control and supervision. Ably assisting him are the Deputy
Commandant, the Chief of Star the twelve (12) central staffs, the operating units and the
support units.
Its area of responsibility covers the maritime jurisdiction of the Philippines,
embracing almost 802,800 square miles of the sea, comprising of 7,107 islands.
Traversing across the seas on the 24 hours basis are more than 10,000 commercial
vessels of various types carrying passengers and cargoes from and into the 315 ports
located along the 34,000 kilometers stretch of coastline of the archipelago. It has more
than 11,000 coastal barangays serving as home bases to more than 4,000 small fishing
boats venturing out at sea.
For wider coverage, the PCG has ten Districts, 53 Stations, and 180 Detachments
dispersed nationwide. The area of operation of a District normally covers one or two
regions; a typical Coast Guard Station, two or more coastal provinces; and a Detachment
covers at least three coastal municipalities. In addition, there are four (4) Coast Guard
Passenger Assistance Ofces, 25 Clearing Outposts and 17 CG Mobile teams in key
areas. (see map)
B. PCG RESOURCES
1. MANPOWER

91

The vast area of responsibility easily overnvhelms the Coast Guard's
manpower complement of 4,000 'personnel assigned ashore and afloat. At the present,
the organization is recruiting additional personnel in the hope of achieving the desired
manpower complement of 9,000.
2. VESSEL/AIRCRAFT
The Coast Guard today operates eight vessels, 46 small craft and 23
environmental watercraft. It also has one BN Islander Carcass and one 105 helicopter.
To fully cover the maritime jurisdiction, additional vessels will be purchased eventually.
C. COAST GUARD'S ANTI PIRACY EFFORTS
The Coast Guard deploys patrol ships and small craft along the piracy
prone areas to deter pirate bands from perpetrating their activities. Just last week, March
2 to be exact, joint elements of CG 2/CGIIF and Port State Control Manila were able to
apprehend four pirates and confiscate from them 220 yards of mooring lines, one electric
grinder, one breathing apparatus, and one chain block that were divested from MV
CHRISTY of EURO Carrier Corporation while anchored 2.5 miles off Manila Bay
anchorage area. The pirates' watercraft, Mbca SAUDI WITH LOVE was also seized in
the process. The apprehended persons and the confiscated items were turned over to the
Western Police District Station 5 for interrogation or investigation and proper disposition,
respectively.
The exercise of Port State Control on ships entering major ports and harbors by
the PCG facilitates the identification and recovery of pirate ships and apprehension of
pirates. The ships in different areas can call the Coast Guard Stations and Districts
through the Marine band and the international distress frequency 500-megahertz.
With the adoption of the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System
(CGMDSS)
anytime this year, ship crew, by switching on an Electronic Position Identification.
Reconnaissance Beacon (EPIRB) could easily send out a distressed signal during the
occurrence of piracy. Persistent EPIRB signals would able Search and Rescue (SAR)
vessels and aircraft to respond immediately.
IV.

LEGAL SYSTEM

Piracy is included under one of the heinous crimes as provided for in Republic
Act Number 7659 that are punishable by death
Convictions are rare with the recurrent problem of prosecuting pirates since
witnesses are afraid to testify. Lack of convictions has only emboldened pirates to pursue
their activities.
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V.

CONCLUSION
Addressing the problem of piracy in Philippine waters has become an enormous
task for the different law enforcement agencies, including the Philippine Coast Guard
given their current capability and the geographic reality and the economic condition of
the country. Compounding the problem is the persistent involvement of terrorist
dissidents and secessionist elements that conduct piracy both as a means to generate
money and as a military and political tool to demonstrate that they are still a force to
reckon with.
Given their limited capability, law enforces have linked together in a spirit of
solidarity for mutual benefit and for ensuring maritime security. There are inter-agency
committees like the National Law Enforcement Coordinating Committee (NALECC) and
the Philippine Center on Transnational Crime (PCTC) that are used for this purpose. The
PCTC is a very new presidential body that was created by virtue of Executive Order No.
62 to formulate and implement a concerted program of action of all law enforcement,
intelligence and other agencies for the prevention and control of transnational crimes,
which include piracy. It concretizes cooperation, concerted operations and data resource
sharing between and among local agencies and with foreign countries and international
organizations involved in' the crusade against transnational crime.
On the regional front, cooperation and linkages have been initiated to combat all
forms of lawlessness including, exchanges of information and records in criminal
activities, investigations, apprehensions, extradition and handling of criminals. Bilateral
agreements entered into by the Philippine government with neighboring countries have
paved the way for closer cooperation, coordination and well-oiled networking in matters
of mutual interest. As for the ASEAN, it has responded with challenges in the past by
seeking security in general unity and will continue to do so.
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Appendix C
Extract of Articles 100-107, 58(2) and 111 of the 1982 UNCLOS
Article 100
Duty to co-operate in the repression of piracy
All States shall co-operate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high
seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.
Article 101
Definition of piracy
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by
the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i)
on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board
such ship or aircraft;
(ii)
against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any
State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of any aircraft with knowledge of
facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b).
Article 102
Piracy by a warship, government ship or government aircraft whose crew has mutinied
The acts of piracy, as defined in article 101, committed by a warship, government ship or
government aircraft whose crew has mutinied and taken control of the ship or aircraft are assimilated
to acts committed by a private ship or aircraft.
Article 103
Definition of a private ship or aircraft
A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft if it is intended by the persons in
dominant control to be used for the purpose of committing one of the acts referred to in article 101.
The same applies if the ship or aircraft has been used to commit any such act, so long as it remains
under the control of the persons guilty of that act.
Article 104
Retention or loss of the nationality of a pirate ship or aircraft
A ship or aircraft may retain its nationality although it has become a pirate ship or aircraft.
The retention or loss of nationality is determined by the law of the State from which such nationality
was derived.
Article 105
Seizure of a pirate ship or aircraft
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may
seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and
arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the
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seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken
with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.
Article 106
Liability for seizure without adequate grounds
Where the seizure of a ship or aircraft on suspicion of piracy has been effected without
adequate grounds, the State making the seizure shall be liable to the State the nationality of which is
possessed by the ship or aircraft for any loss or damage caused by the seizure.
Article 107
Ships and aircraft which are entitled to seize on account of piracy
A seizure on account of piracy may be carried out only by warships or military aircraft, or
other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized
to that effect.

Article 58(2)
Rights and duties of other States in the exclusive economic zone
2.

Article 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive economic
zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part.

Article 111
Right of hot pursuit
1.

2.

3.
4.

The hot pursuit of a foreign ship may be undertaken when the competent authorities of the
coastal State have good reason to believe that the ship has violated the laws and regulations of
that State. Such pursuit must be commenced when the foreign ship or one of its boats is within
the internal waters, the archipelagic waters, the territorial sea or the contiguous zone of the
pursuing State, and may only be continued outside the territorial sea or the contiguous zone if the
pursuit has not been interrupted. It is not necessary that, at the time when the foreign ship within
the territorial sea or the contiguous zone receives the order to stop, the ship giving the order
should likewise be within the territorial sea or the contiguous zone. If the foreign ship is within a
contiguous zone, as defined in article 33, the pursuit may only be undertaken if there has been a
violation of the rights for the protection of which the zone was established.
The right of hot pursuit shall apply mutatis mutandis to violations in the exclusive economic
zone or on the continental shelf, including safety zones around continental shelf installations, of
the laws and regulations of the coastal State applicable in accordance with this Convention to the
exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf, including such safety zones.
The right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship pursued enters the territorial sea of its own
State or of a third State.
Hot pursuit is not deemed to have begun unless the pursuing ship has satisfied itself by such
practicable means as may be available that the ship pursued or one of its boats or other craft
working as a team and using the ship pursued as a mother ship is within the limits of the
territorial sea, or, as the case may be, within the contiguous zone or the exclusive economic zone
or above the continental shelf. The pursuit may only be commenced after a visual or auditory
signal to stop has been given at a distance which enables it to be seen or heard by the foreign
ship.
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5.
6.

7.

8.

The right of hot pursuit may be exercised only by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or
aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that
effect.
Where hot pursuit is effected by an aircraft:
(a) the provisions of paragraphs 1 to 4 shall apply mutatis mutandis;
(b) the aircraft giving the order to stop must itself actively pursue the ship until a ship or another
aircraft of the coastal State, summoned by the aircraft, arrives to take over the pursuit,
unless the aircraft is itself able to arrest the ship. It does not suffice to justify an arrest
outside the territorial sea that the ship was merely sighted by the aircraft as an offender or
suspected offender, if it was not both ordered to stop and pursued by the aircraft itself or
another aircraft or ships which continue the pursuit without interruption.
The release of a ship arrested within the jurisdiction of a State and escorted to a port of that State
for the purposes of an inquiry before the competent authorities may not be claimed solely on the
ground that the ship, in the course of its voyage, was escorted across a portion of the exclusive
economic zone or the high seas, if the circumstances rendered this necessary.
Where a ship has been stopped or arrested outside the territorial sea in circumstances which do
not justify the exercise of the right of hot pursuit, it shall be compensated for any loss or damage
that may have been thereby sustained.
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Appendix D
Samples Certificate of Origin
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